Soccer Review 2005

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Soccer Review 2005

Compiled and edited by

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Editorial

This is the fourth edition of *Soccer Review*, a publication that is made possible by the help of the Professional Footballers Association. This help comes without any attempt to exercise any kind of editorial influence. Again this is a fact worth putting on record in an era in which financial assistance increasingly seems to come with strings attached. Of course, one implication of this benign approach to assistance is that the PFA carry no responsibility for the views expressed and arguments developed in the articles contained in this or in the previous editions, with, of course, the exception of their own contribution.

In previous editions of the *Soccer Review* we have monitored the development of Simon Clifford's career in football - the expansion of his Leeds based futebol de salão coaching network and his ownership and management of Garforth Town FC. This interview constitutes our first item in this edition. Over the past seven to eight years these activities have attracted a considerable amount of media interest. Yet this coverage pales before that generated by his brief partnership with Sir Clive Woodward at Southampton. In this edition's interview, conducted by Patrick Murphy (University of Chester), he gives his account of how his relationship with Woodward came about, how it developed and how things reached such a pitch that he felt he had no choice but to resign. He also reflects upon his first direct experience of football at the higher levels and what he holds to be its shortcomings. The upshot of these events is that Clifford has returned to Leeds with a renewed confidence in his methods. Through his coaching network and the elevation of Garforth Town, he is determined to demonstrate the greater effectiveness of his approach to the development young footballers and, thereby, compel the football authorities to take note.

It is undeniably the case that as far as the media are concerned 'bad news' is 'good news' and 'more positive news' tends to be ignored or granted only marginal coverage. While not alone in this regard, football is certainly one of the more prominent targets for this treatment. The ferocity of the newspapers' circulation war means that it is seemingly impossible to counter-balance the deluge of sensational and prurient stories. It is not argued that newspaper editors and journalists are malevolently intent on damaging football, but many of the gratuitous stories they write and run strongly suggest that they are indifferent to the consequences they have for the game. They are seemingly consumed by other agendas. Nevertheless, in the second article, Gordon Taylor, the Chief Executive of the PFA, attempts to correct the balance by providing an over-view of the range of community-centred activities engaged in by his organisation, his members and their clubs.

Article 3 is by Gavin Mellor (Manchester Metropolitan University). He places some of the activities of the PFA, the clubs and the players in a broader context. The author provides a follow-up report to a contribution he made to the *Soccer Review 2003* concerning research he and his colleagues are undertaking for the Football Foundation. Their general of area of concern is the relationship between football clubs and their local communities. More specifically, the focus of this article is on the tensions that tend to arise between clubs pursuing commercial objectives and when they are performing ostensibly non-profit-making activities within their communities.

The fourth article is by Stephen Morrow (University of Sterling). He examines the decline in the competitive standing of Scotland's football team, a situation that finds expression in its present lowly world ranking. He places this decline in the context of international processes, such as the consequences of the Bosman ruling and the influx of overseas players. He also relates this decline to the lack of adequate facilities and the relative failure of the youth development strategies pursued by the Scottish FA.

The next two articles (five and six) are by Roger Penn (University of Lancaster). In the first one he provides an overview of some of the new and transformed stadia that have come to grace the Premier League in the 1990s and beyond. He sees these edifices as embodying and evoking powerful emotions that link these structures to the histories of the clubs and/or to previous grounds. He argues that these features have powerful resonance for supporters. Moreover, they also have explanatory implications for what he sees as the new forms of behaviour within stadia. He

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argues that these emerging patterns help to account for the absence of graffiti at Premier League stadia in contrast to their counterparts in Serie A. (This article is supplemented by click-on photographs). Penn's second paper compares the behaviour of fans in and around grounds at the elite levels of football in England and Italy. It complements his first paper in that it too is based on observational research conveyed to the reader descriptively and photographically. It is, however, important to emphasis that it does not purport to cover disorders that occur some distance from grounds in the broader context of match day context and, in our view, these forms of behaviour continue to be an element of, at least, football in England.

The seventh article is by Seamus Kelly (University College Dublin) and Ivan Waddington (University of Chester, University College Dublin and the University of Oslo). They explore the relationship between managers and players with particular reference to the variation in disciplinary codes and the ways in which they are enforced in the context of what they describe as a predominantly 'robust and masculine culture'. This enforcement often involves verbal intimidation that, on occasions, escalates into physical assault, with one manager resorting to hitting his players on the head with a cricket bat. It seems that some players are so used to this culture of intimidation that they have difficulty in adjusting to less authoritarian, more democratic styles of management.

The final three articles are by Patrick Murphy. In the first one (article eight) he revisits the development of football hooliganism in England over the period from the late 1950s to 1990. It is a partial synopsis of the thesis that he and his colleagues have developed and elaborated upon in four books. It is presented with the aim of providing a backcloth to the two pieces that follow. In the second of these contributions (article nine) he focuses on the development of counter-hooligan strategies since 1990. He argues that, in regard to football hooliganism, the 1990s are a much neglected and little understood decade because views of this period have tended to be distorted by the over-bearing influence of the official version. Throughout this period successive Conservative and Labour governments cultivated and disseminated the view that football hooliganism had to all intents and purposes ceased to be a problem. Murphy tries to unravel the roots of this misconception. In the final contribution to this edition (article ten) he explores the machinations of the legislative process that paralleled the developments he traced in the previous article. He concludes that that the period from the 1990s was one in which successive governments set out to persuade the media and through them the public at large that the battle against football hooliganism had been won, but that in the event, they fell victims to their own self-induced complacency.

Finally, the incidental photographs for this edition and the previous editions of *Soccer Review* have been provided by Niels Nyholm and we would like to express our thanks to him.

Patrick Murphy & Ivan Waddington

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A brief stay on the South Coast: an interview with Simon Clifford, the Director of Garforth Town and the Futebol de Salão (fds) Coaching Schools Network by Patrick Murphy

The birth of a partnership

PM: Two events seem to stand out from your last year. Firstly, last season, under your management, Garforth Town won promotion to the Northern Counties East League, Premier Division and, secondly, your short-lived involvement with Sir Clive Woodward at Southampton. The move to Southampton has obviously been your most radical departure. To live in interesting times is a Chinese curse and it would seem to be an apt description of your last few months at that club. Therefore, I'd like you to take me through the whole story beginning with how this partnership between you and Sir Clive (CW) emerged.

SC: I met Clive for the first time just over a year ago. I supposed that I was flattered that he had asked to meet me. We got on straight away. He said he wanted to get involved in football. Rupert Lowe had made him an offer when he was still with the England rugby team but he didn't want to go into football with someone who was already well established in the game. He told me he had met with Trevor Brooking, Howard Wilkinson, Sammy Lee and Mark Palios and he concluded that there was only one man he wanted alongside him and to my surprise I was that man. He said that he wouldn't be able to achieve his goals in football without me. From there on we talked perhaps eight or nine times a day and over the next few months our friendship developed. He can be very persuasive and I started to buy into the whole thing. I thought that he was a pretty special person.

PM: Was the decision to go to Southampton an agonising one?

SC: Yes. I kept having doubts about my ability to run the Leeds end of our operation – the fds coaching network and Garforth Town. Clive said he would be happy for me to maintain these commitments. He and his wife said to me on many occasions that my Southampton responsibilities would help to boost my other interests by giving me access to more prominent players. I changed my mind many times, but Clive is a very persuasive man. He refuses to take no for an answer. If I ever sounded negative about the move, he would fly to Leeds, meet me for breakfast and persuade me to change my mind. He wanted me to put pen to paper as soon as possible. He wanted me to commit myself to the same contract as him.

PM: Presumably you met with Rupert Lowe, the Chief Executive of Southampton, before the deal was done? How did you take to him?

SC: I quickly developed a bond with him. While he is Chief Executive of Southampton this didn't get in the way of us quickly developing a close relationship.

PM: Were you surprised that you took to him so readily because his public persona seems to be quite diffident?

SC: I agree. I was very wary at first because of the image I'd formed of him through the media, but the reality couldn't have been more different. I never found him anything other than honest and straightforward. I really like the guy. His attitude towards me made me feel really confident about the whole venture. Clive and I were given his unequivocal backing. We were given very good contracts and, in addition to this, Clive and I made a separate agreement that whatever we did in football over the next fifteen years we would work together and I would be paid 75% of whatever he received. As regards the work itself, I have to say that I was excited by the prospect. I thought that all the experience I'd had to date with young players could now be applied in the context of a big club.

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Plan A

PM: What was 'Plan A' at Southampton?

SC: In effect Clive was offered the job of manager, if not in name. While this sounds premature - given that he is still taking his coaching qualification - he was going there to become the manager. It was just a question of biding his time. The initial plan was that if Southampton were relegated at the end of the 2004-05 season we could take over in the summer. He would become the manager and I would become the head coach. However, if the club stayed up it was anticipated that Harry Redknapp would have carried on because neither Clive nor I had the UEFA-Pro licence. I had already expressed my reservations to Clive about us taking over for the 2005-06 season. I said to him that if the two guys in charge of the first team at the start of the 2005-06 season are you and me it will be ludicrous. I said to him are you prepared to stand there with 30,000 people chanting: 'You don't know what you're doing'. It will start up within five minutes and the press will go mad. I think Rupert's attitude was – 'Damn it, - let's go for the radical approach'. But it was just too radical, even for me. We needed someone with experience at our side. In fact this lack of caution made me to have some reservations about the judgment of Clive and Rupert.

PM: So what was the outcome?

SC: Since I didn't see plan A as being feasible, my alternative idea was that Clive and I should start by working with the reserve team. My argument was that if we had a year with the reserves and achieved a reasonable degree of success we could win the players' respect. So, in the event, we settled on this approach. Rupert made it clear to us that come hell or high water we would be in charge of the first team for the 2006-07 season. He mentioned Burley and Tigana, but over the preceding six months Clive had built what he thought was a good relationship with Harry. Whether it was a genuine relationship or one based more on expediency I don't know. I think that Harry knew why Clive was coming in and he was ready to quit last summer. But I think that Clive felt more threatened by a Burley or Tigana.

PM: I think most people in football would see Redknapp as old school and that, while Burley may have constituted more of a threat to CW's ambitions, he would be likely to be more receptive to Woodward's ideas.

SC: Partly because of Harry's age and the fact that he seemed to tolerate us, we stuck with him.

PM: So CW doesn't see himself as Southampton's Director of Football?

SC: No. He wants to be the manager. He just wants to focus on first team affairs and with someone –originally me - as first team coach. He was given his present job to prepare himself for this task. They gave me a job. They called me 'head of sports science'. This was changed to something else within two weeks, but they were just nonsense titles.

Encountering resistance

PM: So what were your first days at the club like?

SC: When I first arrived at Southampton my hopes were high. A document had been approved by the board two weeks before my arrival and this was a blueprint for how we would take the club forward over the next four or five years. Harry agreed to mentor Clive as manager and me as first team coach. Clive had a meeting at Harry's house and Harry signed up to this arrangement. So when I arrived I thought that everyone was on board with this vision and would offer me support. But I was soon brought face to face with reality. Things were pretty difficult from the off. What I didn't realise was that because of the salary I was receiving and the position I would take, there was a great deal of animosity and resentment towards me. I didn't know any of the other guys there and, initially, I naively assumed that we would all be pulling in the same direction. I thought that everybody would want to get on with me. It didn't take long to realise that there was a real coldness towards me. There were petty things like people making things as difficult as they could for me. Equipment that should have been readily available was locked-up.

PM: Do you think someone was overseeing this strategy of obstruction?

SC: You couldn't put all these obstacles in our way without Harry's blessing. My one condition for taking the helm the following year was having one season with the reserves and Rupert agreed. On this basis, Clive wanted to ring fence the reserves and then ensure that they embarrassed the first team with their success. We wanted to have the reserve squad training three times as hard as the first team squad and developing better techniques. It would have almost been a club within a club. But these plans were thwarted. Stewart Henderson, the reserve team manager, complained to Harry and received his backing. Clive said we better go along with that and advised me to be patient. So we settled for being assistant coaches. Come the first reserves match Henderson told us that we weren't allowed in the dressing room or in the dugout. We were assigned to the stands. How does that square with being assistant coaches? But Clive again urged caution, saying we should just bide our time. This situation continued all the time I was there. Clive promised me that things would change, but they never did. Nothing ever happened.

PM: Are there any other examples of obstacles being put in your way?

SC: Too many to mention. For example, Clive and I made a big effort with the fitness guys from the academy and the first team and we had a long session with them. The next day they just blanked us. Later we were informed that Dave Bassett had told them to ignore us. He said it was either 'them or us'. The result was that nobody on the staff took a blind bit of notice of us and I probably bore the brunt of this hostility. At one point I said to Clive 'there's going to be blood on the floor here at some time so we might as well get some of it over with now rather than later'.

Coaching the young players

PM: Given all these obstacles, how did you spend your time?

SC: I was the first in most days, around 6.50 am. When we were both in our office, there were times when we had nothing to do. On occasions we were so bored that we used to compete to answer the phone when it rang. The one thing we were allowed to do relatively unhindered was work with some of the young players. We did at least have Harry's agreement that we could coach the young players who had left the Academy and perhaps weren't going to figure greatly in the first team. This concession fitted in with Harry's spin that my coaching was for kids.

PM: At the moment Southampton seem to have an excellent group of young players. What impression did you form of the youth set-up there?

SC: While Southampton have spent a deal of money on the Academy, I have to say I was expecting a great deal more. The coaching and practising I witnessed was as poor as I've seen anywhere. The first day I arrived I attended the Annual Academy Banquet. There were hundreds present, young lads and their parents. Huw Jennings, the Director of the Academy, addressed them. His basic message was 'Lads we can't promise that you're going to be a footballer'. It was one of the most depressing presentations I've heard in my life. He then spent the next 30 minutes trying to sell them Umbro boots. At first I couldn't get my head round how the Academy squad has done so well and Southampton have produced such a talented group of young players. However, I soon came to appreciate that it was largely down to the ability of a scout called Malcolm Elias. He is, in my opinion, the most capable man on the football side at Southampton. The majority of the talented players had been 'bought' at 15 or 16 from other clubs. Working with these and other young players was for me the high point of my time at Southampton. To be given – albeit begrudgingly – fifteen junior internationals to work with every day was exciting. When I first met them the prevailing ethos was do as little as possible. If any player did anything extra he was referred to as a 'busy b------d'. Although Theo Walcott was the star, I could see that the toughest lad in the group was Leon Best. I needed to get him on my side. I asked Leon if he would take the other lads into town to buy the special fds footwear for our evening training sessions.

The morning session was often a technical topic for an hour. In the evening we would play fds in a school gym to music, as is my custom. I led the morning sessions and they were a great success. They would arrive at 7.30. am – which in itself is quite radical- have breakfast and start work about

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8.15. At my first meeting with the group, in contrast to Huw Jenning's approach, I said to them let's not be the best in Southampton, but in Britain or the world. Some afternoons I would ring them and if they weren't doing anything we would go to David Lloyd's and do the fds skills badge in the dance hall. I'd time them and film them.

PM: What form did the practice sessions take?

SC: We did a lot of sessions nine against nine. I felt we had a big problem converting chances into goals. In the sessions that they had been used to a striker might get three or four scoring opportunities. I arranged their practice in such a way as to ensure that they got five or six hundred opportunities to shoot into a little goal. Clive and I filmed these sessions, using a programme called dart-fish. We also invited along two professors from Bath. They were going to do the biomechanical analyses of the players. One of my regrets is not being able to continue my work with those guys. The young players were buying into my approach. Leon Best's sister rang me and said that he'd never enjoyed training before. Nathan Dyer went out on loan to Burnley for a period. He rang me one day and said 'Simon it's the same here as at Southampton. We get two days off a week.' The measure of how they were responding to these sessions was that when lads were injured they would still turn up. For example, on one occasion Martin Cranie and Matthew Mills played for the first team against Watford, yet they still turned up and did the accompanying music for me. Leon Best turned up when he was injured. When Theo Walcott got into the first team Harry barred him from training with me, but he still came to the evening sessions and just sat on the bench. It became a very well integrated group. After Theo started scoring for the first team he said some really complimentary stuff about me in an interview. That was great at the time, but I also think it intensified the management team's hostility towards me. What I was able to achieve with these young players was done against the backcloth of a general hostility towards me. For example, on one occasion at a reserve game, Nathan Dyer and Leon Best came to sit with me. They said: 'We really feel sorry for you because we have been told to ignore everything you say'.

PM: Did you ask them who had given them this instruction?

SC: No. It wouldn't have been fair to put them on the spot. Redknapp's men were always on the lookout for any way to undermine my position. On one occasion Martin Cranie did a morning session with me. I pulled him out of it early. Later on he did a first team session and pulled a hamstring. Needless to say, I got the blame. Harry told some journalists that they had lost him because Clifford's over-training him.

Blood on the floor

PM: Was it all just sniping or were there any major bust-ups? Did you ever retaliate?

SC: While I was there we had two meetings for coaches led by Clive. Around fourteen guys were present. At the first meeting someone made a critical remark about me and I responded. Before the second meeting – this was held a couple of weeks before my departure - Clive asked me not to react if anyone criticised me. He said that I should just bite my tongue. Harry was present at this one. He sat there with his feet on the table. It was clear to me that Dave Bassett had been instructed to undermine me. On the Friday before this meeting Clive had asked me to watch a player, a forward, we had been working with and who was presently out on loan. Halfway through the meeting Clive - and remember he'd advised me not to speak - asked me for my appraisal of the player. I didn't make a big deal about it. I just said that he had done OK. He did a substantial amount of closing down, performed his defensive duties. He hadn't achieved a great deal in attack, but I added, in fairness to the lad, that the service he received hadn't been wonderful. Nothing controversial. Bassett immediately responded by saying: 'That's f-----g funny Simon' cause Howard Wilkinson said he's f-----g s--t.' He was clearly trying to rile me, but at that point I simply said that I was just reporting upon his performance in one game. It's worth noting that the lad in question was one of our academy players. You would have thought the Academy Director would have been on his feet defending him from this kind of unwarranted abuse…

The article in question

PM: But given that this meeting was a couple of weeks before your departure, this confrontation couldn't have been the final straw?

SC: No. That was triggered by an article I did on how I thought we could change football. Initially Clive said it was great. This was at a time when I felt that I was really getting somewhere with the young lads. Then the day after it was published - it was a Friday - I arrived at the training ground at quarter to seven to prepare for my usual session at half past seven, but no one turned up. I went to look for the players in the changing room and discovered that someone had photocopied the article and stuck a copy on every player's locker. It looked like a serial killer's pad. The main point made in the article was that I thought professional footballers should work twice as hard as they are accustomed to do. Clearly, the aim in putting copies up in the locker room was to point out to the players, particularly the ones who were getting on with me, that this is what Clifford really thinks of you. He thinks you're all lazy. I ripped them down.

The view from Leeds

PM: What happened in the immediate aftermath of your exit?

SC: After leaving, I spent a day with a solicitor. It wasn't because I wanted to seek compensation. Quite the reverse, I wanted to make sure that I couldn't be sued for breach of contract. In the course of the week after my exit Rupert tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade me to come back.

PM: What of your relationship with CW?

SC: To be fair, on one level I suppose we did complement one another. He used to invite me to the boardroom for a meal, but I had no interest in doing that sort of thing. He was great at all that. He is a diplomat and a politician and I'm not.

PM: CW is clearly a very persuasive man. He persuaded you to buy into his vision of the future. Therefore, it comes as a surprise to me that he seems to have had so little to say and be so non-interventionist at Southampton.

SC: Rupert appointed Clive and Clive recruited me because we were outside the football box. I was brought in to initiate radical change. That's what Rupert and Clive wanted. One of Clive's key phrases is that he 'wants to turn football upside down and rip it inside-out'.

While this is what he wants to do, he doesn't tell anyone. He is caught between wanting to change things and wanting to be accepted by the football fraternity. The problem was that his wish to get on with the old guard meant that I was left without any back-up, without any support. On occasions Rupert wanted to step in and sort problems out, but he was constrained because that was the job he was paying Clive to do.

PM: So what's your relationship with CW now?

SC: We still communicate. But from the outset, I don't think Clive really understood what sort of man I am. Anyone could do what I was being allowed to do at Southampton. Given the kind of guy I am, I couldn't sit there quietly and simply take the money. I don't want to take money under false pretences. He might as well have set fire to my salary.

PM: You said that he also seems to fear the media. How, for example, has he reacted to the series of cartoons of him in *The Guardian*?

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SC: One in particular made me laugh. It said that 'Cliffo may have gone, but every leader needs his right hand man'. (It gave some examples like Sooty needs Sweep etc.) Nevertheless, it continued: 'Cliffo's spirit lives on and at 4.00 am tomorrow the players will be running backward wearing wet suits'

PM: So you looked at these cartoon, but he wouldn't?

SC: He wouldn't read any newspapers. I think this started with the negative coverage of the Lions tour. That hurt him. He would telephone me and ask me to tell him what was being written. In fairness, you can be honest with him on a face-to-face basis and he will take and respond to criticisms. He certainly doesn't want to surround himself with 'yes' men.

PM: Apart from Rupert Lowe and the satisfaction that you derived from working with the young players was there no one that offered you consistent support?

SC: No. Not really. While he probably won't thank me for saying it, Kevin Bond isn't a bad lad. He was pretty decent to me. I think he felt sorry for me. I think the whole atmosphere towards me can be summed up by a chat one morning. He said that he was sorry I'd been stonewalled, but that I should appreciate that football is the most insecure profession in the world. People are just scared for their jobs because they don't really know what's going on. So it's not personal. I thanked him for ringing me. When I was down there, to be seen to be speaking to me openly would not have been well received.

PM: Of course we can't know how the situation at Southampton will develop, but CW does seem to have been very fortunate that his path crossed Rupert Lowe's because there can't be many chief executives of big clubs that would be prepared to risk such an innovation. If this opportunity is foreclosed, he may not get another chance. From what you said earlier, CW will not have welcomed the appointment of George Burley. Burley has got a good record. He's a competent manager. He has inherited a promising group of young players. He stands a reasonable chance of making a success of the job. Where would that leave CW?

SC: It will create a problem for him. I don't know what he'll do, but I don't think Clive will play second fiddle to anyone for long.

PM: When you say that CW wants to be a manager and not a director of football and he wanted you to be the first team coach I'm not really clear about how he saw his job.

SC: I don't know. In an interview he gave to Patrick Barclay of The Telegraph he said that he couldn't imagine doing this without me. Of course, he could still make a good fist of it, but in truth I don't know what he'll do now I've quit.

PM: Was not the problem his timing? Should he not have got his qualifications before being appointed?

SC: Yes. It was far too early and too high up the football pyramid. Once there, I was impatient to get on with the job. But it was Clive's impatience that put me in that position. There was also the question of the money. Clive also wanted a certain life-style. All I can say is that Clive was in too much of a hurry to be interested in this kind of approach.

PM: So the irony is that while CW wanted you because he believed you had certain qualities, the situation in which he placed you was self-defeating because it stifled these very qualities.

SC: Yes. There wasn't enough scope for me to use what talents I have. Now I'm back in Leeds I'm free of these kinds of constraints.

A job too far

PM: Even given a man of your undoubted energy, wasn't the Southampton job stretching you too far?

SC: I agree. But in the first instance, if the Southampton job had meant me giving up my other activities, I wouldn't have accepted it. In retrospect keeping all those balls in the air was impossible. Had we taken over the management and first team coaching, I would have had to delegate most of my other responsibilities. Initially Clive was eager to send me home on a Thursday afternoon and I didn't have to return to Southampton until the Sunday night. Nevertheless, the pressure was soon on to treat it as a full-time job and over the last three weeks before my departure, I was more or less full-time. Even at weekends I had to watch under-18 games just for the sake of appearances and this annoyed me.

The state of play

PM: Before going to Southampton you didn't have a very high opinion of football management and coaching. Did your experience there harden your views?

SC: Near the beginning I said to Clive that if my stint at Southampton ends in six weeks I'll go back to Leeds fired-up and enthused. Previously I thought that I was right. Now I know I am. It was such an eye-opener. The prevailing view is that if you haven't played the game professionally you're no one. It's a self-serving monopoly. If you're not an insider you're excluded. Maybe if you're prepared to treat them as the font of all wisdom for long enough they might come to accept you. But in my view the whole thing is a bluff. We had Prozone there. It's a useful piece of software. I never saw Harry look at it once.

PM: What would be your major criticisms of the prevailing approach to coaching?

SC: I would make two general criticisms. One of the biggest shortcomings with coaching is that the coaches don't seem to have any idea of the potential of the players – both technically and physically. Their horizons are too low. The other day Trevor Brooking paid me a compliment. He said that large chunks of my programme should be adopted for the development of young players. While it is easier to induct 8 to 12 years olds into this programme and it's much more difficult to recapture the lost ground with 20 year olds, its not impossible and that is what I was trying to do at Southampton.

PM: But you were playing catch-up?

SC: Yes, but if players and coaches are willing to put in the extra time and effort after team training it's surprising what can be achieved. At Garforth Town our most improved player is Brett Renshaw. He was at Garforth when I arrived. York City came in for him in the summer. He's 23 years old and not an fds graduate. He has really bought into my approach and he's now employed full-time as a youth coach.

PM: I have read newspaper accounts of the changing room incident and the central thrust of the article in question was that because of the culture into which professional footballers are brought up they don't work hard enough at developing their skills and fitness. From your point of view, would one manifestation of this be the shortage of quality England players who are comfortable on their left-foot?

SC: We have seven and eight year olds that are completely bilateral. They have no favoured foot. Yet it gets dismissed as kids-stuff and it's said that professional footballers shouldn't be doing this sort of thing. My response is perhaps they wouldn't need to work at developing these skills if they're mastered them at an earlier age. At Southampton we had squares that were ten metres apart with a player in each square. One player passed the ball to a player in another square and the receiving player had to control it first time and pass it back – all within his square. Well, it proved to be very challenging even when they were using their stronger foot. Their control with their weaker foot was just pathetic. In another exercise I asked players to hit a target 10 metres away. I also asked them to estimate how many times they would hit it out of 30. They began by saying 25/26 times. No one scored more than two or three out of 30. And, that was with their stronger foot. While some of the coaches thought that I shouldn't be asking players to do this sort of thing, the players themselves bought into it and there was some improvement in the course of a few weeks. Harry said that I was demeaning the players asking them to perform these sorts of exercises. In some ways I agree because it shouldn't be necessary to start them at this level. The fact that professional footballers can't do it is ridiculous. What are we supposed to do? Just ignore the fact that they haven't got these basis skills. How many times have you heard commentators complain that in England we give the ball away too easily? This is why – a deficiency in basic ball skills.

PM: But there have been young players in the past who have exhibited wonderful ball skills, but who never made it in the professional game. Isn't this the kind of thing that Redknapp has in mind when he refers to your approach as 'kids stuff?

SC: Yes, I agree. Right from the start we have been aware of this and we have placed great emphasis on the physical side of the game, both in terms of strength and stamina. We didn't want to produce

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great technicians who were simply blown away in the heat of battle and this brings me to my second major criticism of the present set-up. I wasn't impressed by the level of fitness of the first team squad at Southampton. If you calculate the league position they would have occupied on the basis of their first half performances this season and compare it with that of the second half of matches, the outcome is very interesting. Their first half performance would put Southampton in third place. In contrast their second half performance would place them seventeenth. In large measure this stark difference has to be down to fitness.

PM: In many matches one sees the game being stretched in the last 30 minutes. I appreciate that an element in this process can be one team throwing caution to the wind in an attempt to secure an equalising or a winning goal, but could it not also be partially related to fitness?

SC: Definitely. The first match after I left Southampton, they were playing Leeds and it couldn't have provided a better demonstration of this point. Southampton were three nil up at half time and some of their fans were chanting: 'Are you watching Simon Clifford?' The final result was Southampton 3 Leeds 4 and some Leeds fans were chanting: 'Simon Clifford's watching you'. I must confess, that was a source of some gratification to me.

Back in harness

PM: Let's turn to Garforth Town. While they gained promotion last year, they don't appear to be doing so well this season. Presumably someone has stepped into your shoes and taken over the management and coaching duties?

SC: Last year I had two coaches working with me. They understood how I worked and they took over. Unfortunately, it hasn't worked. The success of the fds coaching network is assured, but when I was away at Southampton it became clear to me that my lofty ambitions for Garforth Town are not going to be realised without my hands-on presence.

PM: So you are back in harness at Garforth?

SC: Yes. The progress we need to make doesn't faze me and the players are more confident when I'm around. Discipline was a central element of our success last season. Of the 23 games that I was in charge we won 20, drew 2 and lost 1.

PM: Last year's reserves consisted of lads from your local network and you said that your intention was to bring in some lads from your fds network on a nationwide basis for the 2005-06 season. What is the situation?

SC: In the event there were just two. Lee Jones came from Arbroath and John Farnworth from Manchester. They both now reside in Leeds and next year there will be a few more.

PM: Are you disappointed that there haven't been more?

SC: Probably. We have to address the issue of accommodation. That's the biggest obstacle to more coming here. I'm hoping that this summer we bring in another 5 or 6. The first team is still Leeds heavy. We began this season with five fds lads in the first team. They are between 17 and 18 years of age. So we are clearly the youngest team in the league. Since I've come back we have won 3 games and lost one. But realistically we have got to write this year off. I'm still a bit pre-occupied with the residue of the Southampton experience. I haven't really started to focus properly. Last year I spent 3 to 4 hours each evening on the team, coaching or assessing the opposition. I was obsessed and it's that level of commitment that's been missing.

The assembling cohorts

PM: In the next few years you're going to reach a stage where substantial numbers of youngsters begin to graduate from your coaching schools. Give us some names to look out for.

SC: There's Seb Muddel. He is playing in Norwich reserves. In fact he is the youngest player to have ever played for Norwich reserves. He was 14 or 15. Norwich Academy played Southampton Academy the other week and he got 'man of the match'. Seb is still in regular contact with me. He's totally committed to my philosophy and practises religiously for two hours virtually everyday. There's Oliver Hotchkiss at Leeds. He's under-15s, but he played under -19s this year. He's the highest scorer for any age group at Leeds this season as, indeed, he was last year. The club have offered him a scholarship and a professional contract, but there are eight clubs that are interested in him and he's still weighing up where his future lies. In addition to his training at Leeds United, he also does 16 hours fds training each week. There's Micah Richards at Man City. Travis Wheatle has just got into the Welsh under-16s. There's Nick Reilly at Celtic. Jason St Juste is a good prospect but he's been treated appallingly at Southampton.

PM: Why? Is it because he was seen as one of your boys?

SC: Definitely. Jason went from Garforth Town to Darlington. He got six 'man of the match' awards. He was young player of the year and he won the goal of the season competition for the seniors. His contract ran out and on my recommendation, Southampton signed him. He's an attacking mid-fielder and totally two–footed. He can play anywhere across the mid-field. They put him in the reserves and played him at fullback. I think the reserve team coach wanted him to fail. I'm still in touch with Jason and he told me that he had been involved in a training game. He was played at right-back. It seems that the fitness coach and the under-18s coach filled the right and left mid-field positions. Draw your own conclusions.

PM: Look five years ahead. How many graduates from your soccer schools will be playing in the Premier League? How many will be full internationals?

SC: I would say between five and ten. I think that the lads who make it to the Premier League will be quite exceptional and so I think most of them will be in with a chance of international honours.

PM: I'm surprised by the modesty of your estimate of five to ten. I would have anticipated that you would have come up with a substantially higher figure. You're normally more bullish than that. Given the number of graduates coming from your soccer schools in the next five years, five to ten making it to the Premier League doesn't sound particularly ambitious.

SC: Well, I think that's a realistic figure. We have probably got around a 100 lads (15 to 18 years of age) at professional clubs at the moment. I can only guess how many of these will actually come through, but given current patterns of development, 5% to 10% reaching Premier League level strikes me as realistic estimate. If we can achieve this level of success it should have a snowball effect. It may even force the powers that be in football to take my approach more seriously.

Final thoughts

PM: Bearing in mind the old aphorism – 'never say never', would you ever change your mind and consider rejoining CW?

SC: No. I've got such an enormous task on here. It's enough of a challenge. I feel as if I've wasted a year of my life. During my absence the Garforth players have been disoriented. If I'd been at Southampton much longer I think we would have lost some of our younger players.

PM: So you're now resolved to use Garforth Town as the vehicle for demonstrating the merits of your approach.

SC: Yes. I can achieve what I want to achieve here. There's no politics. There's nobody obstructing me, except perhaps the local FA.

PM: It's going to be a long haul getting Garforth into the Conference and then the Football League. Couldn't you have made life easier for yourself by taking over a club in the Conference or the lower reaches of the Football League?

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SC: I've made my bed. What appeals to me about the Garforth Town project is that it looks to be impossible. Come the New Year, my mind will be clear and there will be no stopping me. If I've got any talent it's my drive and imagination. The whole Southampton experience has just been a distraction. Before I went there the ideas used to pour out of me. I've only just begun to think creatively and start writing again. It has been as if I have had writer's block. I feel as if I've been in a fog. The one positive lesson that I derived from my Southampton experience is that it makes me realise and appreciate what we have began to build here in Leeds.

(This interview was conducted in Leeds on 27th December 2005)

The PFA and its Membership's contribution to Government Health Initiatives and Social Improvement

Gordon Taylor, Chief Executive of the Professional Footballers Association

Whilst football and footballers are very quickly the subject of controversial headlines and accusations as soon as there is any misdemeanour on or off the pitch, the general public is rarely given an opportunity to know about the good works that the PFA, football clubs and footballers do on behalf of society in general and local communities in particular. This social responsibility and awareness has been taken on board by players and football clubs and is quite unique to our profession. Such an obligation - employees willingly agreeing to do hours of public relations and community activities each week - is unheard of in any other employment contract. This obligation is now accepted by players and clubs as simply coming with the territory. This article offers a glimpse into some of these activities, activities which for the most part go unrecognised and unpublicised.

The PFA – Inspiring Health in Society

During the past twelve months the Government has been keen to provide leadership and guidance on what constitutes healthy choices and to set out a vision for making those choices easier. Given its cultural centrality, it is not surprising that football is playing a leading part in this strategy, with footballers acting as role models and inspirational figures for many people across society. The Football task force in its research document 'Investing in the Community' states:

> 'Society has no more influential role models than it's professional footballers. Children and young boys in particular will imitate anything they see favourite players do – good or bad, on and off the pitch – and will always listen carefully to what they have to say. This is an onerous responsibility to bear. Young players turn professional because they want to play football and not to set a moral lead to a younger generation. But it also places football in a powerful position of influence and gives the game unique potential to make a positive contribution to the life of the nation.'

It is, therefore, reassuring and refreshing to see so many players displaying a commitment to community work and treating it as part and parcel of their job and doing so in spite of the fact that some of them get little relief from being in the public spotlight.

Over 7 million adults and 5 million children play football each year and over half a million people attend professional matches each week. It is this mass appeal that is being utilised to reinforce health messages and build upon football's and the PFA's track record of involvement in promoting healthy lifestyles. As part of the campaign to use the power of football to promote a wide range of educational, social inclusion, and community initiatives, the PFA and its members are endeavouring to reach those groups who are notoriously difficult to engage by other means, such as young men.

The PFA's commitment to the Governments Health initiative include many examples of the inspirational work undertaken by the players as role models including:

i) ***Encouraging young people to drink milk*** – The PFA worked with Dairy UK and the Milk Development Council on a promotion to encourage the nation's children to drink more milk. The promotion used James Beattie as the face of the campaign, which involved milk bars being taken into 500 schools and over 200 million milk cartons branded as 'Milk-the drink of the Professional Footballer'.

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ii) ***Raising awareness of testicular cancer*** – Cancer charities have linked with the PFA and FA to promote awareness and self-examination for testicular and prostrate cancers. This included adverts in match programmes and half-time announcements, posters in players' changing rooms and providing information for club doctors to pass on to their teams. Thierry Henry was used as the face of this campaign.



iii) ***Promoting positive health choices*** – Manchester City and Manchester United football clubs have been instrumental in utilising the influence that players can have on the lives of both children and adults within their own local communities. These include initiatives such as cardiovascular rehabilitation, weekly health walks, dental health programmes, free blood pressure testing, and campaigns on anti-smoking, drugs, alcohol and many more.

Danny Mills, Manchester City and England player commented at a recent anti-smoking campaign:

> 'As a premiership footballer it is vital that I keep fit and healthy so that I can perform at my full potential. It's in the closing minutes of matches when games are won and lost so it is important that I am fitter and have more energy than my opponent. That is why I don't smoke – smoking damages your lungs, making it harder to run fast or to keep going as long – I don't smoke because I want to win'.

This is exactly the type of message that enables players to reach and inspire young people and make a difference in their local communities. The government view the health of the nation as a major concern and priority for intervention. As Richard Caborn, MP, Minister for Sport recently put it:

> 'We are facing a time bomb in the state of our health. A recent National Office Report suggests that obesity costs the UK economy £2 billion each year, and the NHS, £500 million.'

All 92 Premier League and Football League clubs utilise players as a central means by which they fulfil their own social responsibilities to the communities they serve and the importance of this role should never be underestimated. In fact the PFA were the initiators of the National Football in the Community Schemes in the mid-nineteen eighties, at a time when the image of football was in dire need of an extensive overhaul.

The PFA's initiative has prove to be a catalysis in the development of the football in the community movement and a major source of inspiration. Supporting the work of local organisations such as schools and hospitals has become a routine commitment for professional clubs and part of the weekly round of a professional footballer. As a result of these co-ordinated activities football clubs have become the hub of their communities.

Government departments, NHS trusts, local authorities, and football organisations have already combined to use the power of football to promote a wide range of educational, social inclusion, and community initiatives. Marketing players as role models is one of the main themes behind the partnership work aimed at engaging with local communities. Other themes include:

Promoting physical activity – Encouraging participation in football, whatever a person's ability, makes a contribution towards health improvement and reduces the risk of chronic diseases. It can also have a positive effect on mental health by boosting self-esteem.

Promoting healthy living for children – Innovative learning can draw upon football-based examples to inspire young people to improve their diet and nutrition and adopt healthier lifestyles.

Promoting social inclusion – Community-based football coaching programmes can be used to target socially excluded groups and, in the course of which, key messages about health issues and the dangers of drugs and smoking can be communicated and re-enforced.

Providing health facilities at football grounds – There is the potential for football clubs to work with their respective NHS trusts to develop joint facilities at football grounds and attract people who may not otherwise utilise local services. As the partnership with the Government develops, we must not forget that the PFA and the players in particular will continue to be central to this formula, like no other industry, and the inspiration to millions for the future health of our society.

Kick Racism Out of Football

This campaign, now entering its twelfth year, was founded by the PFA. It has set precedents, both in terms of its objectives and in terms of its success in ensuring that the whole of football to unites against racism. The 'Kick It Out' Week of Action is now recognised as a major part of the football calendar and all 92 clubs have demonstrated their commitment to the cause by displaying banners in their stadia and highlighting the campaign's activities in their programmes, They stage half-time events, team managers, club administrators and ground staff wear 'Kick It Out' badges, team managers and players wear T-shirts displaying the 'Kick It Out' message.

As well as this community 700 groups were able to host activities with the Kick It Out Community Chest Grants which are part-funded by the Association.

Kick It Out has developed the Racial Equality Standard for FA Premier League clubs to help them understand the importance of race equality within the club at all levels. This will also be rolled out to Football League clubs. Notts County will be the first club to receive the standard.

Players supporting the campaign include the entire England squad and they wore the 'Kick It Out' badge on their playing strip against Holland and they regularly wear the T-Shirts with the 'Kick It Out' logo during training sessions. The PFA distributed post cards featuring John Terry and Ashley Cole wearing these T-shirts asking players to sign-up as anti-racism ambassadors. Over 500 responses have been received and I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has committed to this campaign.

Show Racism the Red Card

This organisation was set up to harness the potential that professional footballers have as role models in the campaign to combat racism. Over 50 posters have been produced and over 40,000 pin badges and 100,000 stickers were distributed last year. This organisation has provides an exemplary demonstration of the way in which players can be used to motivate and inspire young people with anti-racist ideals. The campaign has been conducted in partnership with nearly 50 clubs over the past year and several players - Rio Ferdinand, Joe Cole, Thierry Henry and Shaka Hislop among them - have appeared in a promotional video and participated in presentations around the country. In 2005 a new educational DVD was launched and distributed free of charge to all schools in Scotland thanks to the generosity of the Scottish Assembly.

Black Victorians Exhibition

The PFA worked with Manchester Arts Gallery to present an exhibition aimed at demonstrating the contribution made by black people to Victorian society, among them the first black footballer Arthur Wharton who made his debut in 1887. A number of school children attended the exhibition during 'Kick It Out's' Week of Action and they met Louis Saha.

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Asians in Football

A report by the National Asians in Football Committee, released a decade after the publication of original ironically entitled report "Asians Can't Play Football" report found that Asians are still excluded at every level of the game. Although we now have four professionals of Asian origin (Zesh Rehman, Fulham; Harpal Singh, Stockport County; Michael Chopra, Newcastle; Adhan Ahmed, Huddersfield) this is massively under-representative of the number of Asians playing football.

Popular myths and stereo-types surrounding Asian players - they have to go to mosque, it would interfere with training, they eat the wrong type of food, they are the wrong build, their parents don't want them to be footballers - need to be dispelled in order that Asians can break through into professional football.

The PFA sponsored the Asians Can Play football conference which looked at ways of addressing this problem and finding solutions. These will be presented in a paper by Dr John Williams of Leicester University to work towards ensuring greater representation of the Asian community in the professional game.

National Game

Since the incidents at and surrounding the England v. Spain game in November 2004, there have been a number of initiatives to ensure our players know that racism will not be tolerated in our game.

- Players at the England game have spoken out regarding the incident and have the full support of their Association in these matters.
- Over 500 players responded to the KIO postcards that were sent out after the Spain game calling for anti-racism Ambassadors
- England squad strips featured Kick It Out badges for the high-profile England v. Holland game.
- The law has been changed so that any individual spectator who makes a racist comment can be arrested and banned from grounds.
- A protocol is now in place for players and match officials to provide a guideline if a football match is overshadowed by racism from the crowd.

Training

The PFA staff have received equality and diversity training to ensure they have an understanding of the issues. This is in line with current activity for all football agencies. The PFA is working with Kick It Out, FA Learning, the Premier League, the Football League and the League Managers Association to provide a training package for scholars, players, managers and their staff. This has been agreed in theory by all agencies and the first step is the induction for scholars which has been implemented into the MASE programme. It will be also be included in the Football League scholarship programme from the beginning of the 2006/07 season.

The training includes contributions from Steven Gerrard, Rio Ferdinand, Ashley Cole, David James and Ledley King discussing their thoughts on the role that players have in the fight against racism.

All Agency Review

The Football Authorities formed the All Agency Review Board in order to share information and best practice on matters relating to equity and diversity. The PFA continues to lead the way on these issues and to ensure that its policies are implemented across the board. The Commission for Racial Equality is working closely with all agencies to ensure that its Report for Racism in football's findings and proposals are adhered to. The CRE has appointed Garth Crooks OBE and Paul Elliott as football advisors who are working closely with the Department and all agencies.

PFA INITIATIVES

Black Coaches Forum

The Career Development of Black Players Forum was launched by the PFA in 1993/94 to provide a voice for players from the recent past to express their frustrations about the lack of opportunities to progress into coaching and management. The forum continues to actively engage with all major footballing bodies to address this inequity. The group reports to the All Agency Review which comprises the Football Association, the FA Premier League, the Football League, the League Managers Association and the Football Foundation who

endorse the aims of the group. We seek to increase the representation of BEM players by way of lobbying, education and legislation.

The work of Paul Davis continues to bridge links with black players taking coaching qualifications and coach educator courses. He is working with a number of high profile black players with regard to their A Licence. Paul will continue this role whilst assisting Paul Gascoigne as Assistant Manager at Kettering Town FC.

The Prince's Trust

The work that the Prince's Trust carries out on behalf of the PFA has become a significant success within football clubs. The Trust has been briefed as to the PFA objective to ensure that players are portrayed as responsible and committed individuals with social responsibility. The Prince's Trust has reached over 75,000 young adults focusing on the hardest to reach group which are often disillusioned with society and ready to opt out of normal life.

By working on the TEAM programme, in partnership with football clubs and players, the young people learn how to work in a group, aiming towards targets with positive direction from their TEAM leaders and footballers acting as role models. The football initiative is a really positive lesson for all concerned and highlights the positive role football can play in enabling youngsters to achieve success.

Player Ambassadors for the Prince's Trust include Rio Ferdinand, Frank Lampard, Alan Smith, Dion Dublin and Steven Taylor.

The National Literacy Trust

This campaign continues to use footballers to inspire and motivate people to enjoy reading. This year the PFA and the FA ran a new poster campaign that demonstrated players from the England squad – Ashley Cole, Alan Smith, Rio Ferdinand and David James – reading books whilst in their England kit on the way to games. The pictures were not staged and it is very clear that the players have enjoyed some time-out by reading a book. The posters have been distributed to over 100,000 children and are displayed in schools, colleges, libraries and book shops.

Oxfam

Oxfam has once again been chosen as our official charity partner for season 2005/06. As of last year we have agreed to support a Christmas appeal to our members to raise money for educational projects. The PFA has donated funds for a classroom to be built in Africa and will be asking delegates to encourage their team-mates to donate to this worthy cause.

Tsunami Appeal

In May this year in partnership with the oil industry and Chelsea FC, a football tournament and fundraising dinner took place raising in excess of £500,000 towards the Tsunami Relief Appeal.

Teenage Cancer Trust

It should also be mentioned that Chelsea's Frank Lampard has raised over £$^1/_2$ million for the Teenage Cancer Trust and this is just one example of one of our prominent young players appreciating his position in the game and using his profile to help others in need.

Children in Need

The PFA raised £16,000 for Children in Need by donating a prize of a VIP package for two people to attend the PFA Awards Dinner and a painting commissioned by the PFA "My World United".

David Beckham flew into London in November to launch his new Football Academy next to the Millennium Dome, his aim being not to make a profit but to allow some 15,000 children a year to reap some of the joy he has received from football. The PFA sponsored a trip by England players, such as Gary Neville and David James, in the summer to Malawi to give support to an Aids Education campaign and David has now set up a farming project there. When I visited Soweto in South Africa with FIFPro, I was able to witness the work of Charlton Athletic in that deprived area and also see evidence of Andy Cole's charity work.

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Mixed Motivations: Why Do Football Clubs Do 'Community' Work?

Gavin Mellor

Introduction

In 2003 I wrote an article for Soccer Review that outlined the early findings of a research project that my colleagues[1] and I had just started for the Football Foundation Community and Education (C&E) Panel. Entitled *Football and its Communities*, the project is a three-year study that has been designed to provide the Football Foundation and the wider football industry with a new vision and understanding of how to engage with 'communities' of various types. The project is now in its final stages, and the project team is currently drawing up a final report which will analyse the relationship between football clubs and 'communities'; clarify who football's communities actually are; and debate the responsibilities that football clubs have towards different groups.

In the 2003 edition of *Soccer Review*, I drew attention to a number of early themes that were emerging from the research. Amongst these was the issue of how football clubs conceptualise and deliver formal community programmes. The article pointed out that many 'traditional' community programmes are primarily concerned with promoting clubs to new generations of supporters, and that as a result some are as concerned (if not more so) with public relations and commercial promotion as they are with the well being of clubs' communities. This theme has been a constant source of discussion throughout our research, and has led us to analyse the full range of possible motivations that clubs can have when undertaking community-focused schemes of work. This article outlines a number of these themes, and draws out a possible way forward which could partially help clubs to overcome the inevitable tensions that emerge when commercial organisations are asked to deliver social intervention work.

A New Context for Football

When English football clubs first developed formal 'football and community' schemes in the 1970s and 1980s, the motivations for doing so were fairly clear. The game was in a period of long decline, and hooliganism had emerged as a sufficiently high-profile social problem as to demand state intervention. It is no surprise then that the first cross-industry 'Football and the Community' scheme launched by the then Sports Council in 1978 had the following aims:

1. The acquisition of new facilities for clubs (in the vast majority of cases).
2. Guidance, advice, facilities and finance to enable greater club involvement with the local community.
3. The discovery of talented young players who, through transfer fees, could produce much-needed finance for some clubs.
4. Increased attendances through better and more frequent contact with the local community.
5. Reductions in football-related hooliganism and violence by providing young fans with better leadership and examples through organised and controlled schemes.[2]

The most notable thing about these aims is the way in which they centre on the needs of football clubs. There may be implicit benefits for 'communities' in what was proposed, but it is clear that the Sports Council scheme was launched primarily in response to *football's problems*, rather than those of its communities.

In the past 10 years, this situation has change dramatically in at least two ways. Firstly, football, at the top level at least, is now perceived to have less industry-specific problems which might be addressed by 'community' schemes, and, secondly, the British government is increasingly interested in the ability of sport in general, and football in particular, to tackle a range of *social* problems. Indeed, since the election of the Labour government in 1997 it has been increasingly assumed that the 'power' and popularity of football in the UK puts it in a unique position to build and sustain communities, and that the game can have positive influences on social and economic regeneration, public health, educational standards, community safety, crime reduction and the tackling of social exclusion.

These changing contexts for English football have produced a problem brought about by the fact that many clubs' attempts to engage with 'new' agendas have largely been undertaken through their community departments and traditional 'football and community' approaches (often in association with the national Football in the Community scheme). This has meant that schemes and approaches which were initially developed, partially at least, to 'sell' football clubs to local communities, are now increasingly being asked to engage in community development work. From our research, we would suggest that any true engagement with new social agendas requires a step-change for English football and the development of new motivations, skills and training and methods of working.[3]

Football's Response to New Agendas

Throughout our research we have encountered a range of responses to the new expectations that have been placed on football in terms of community engagement and development. Some individuals within the football industry have been resistant to the 'community' obligations that are now often placed on the game and have argued that the increasingly business-led nature of professional football should effectively exempt clubs from onerous community or social obligations. In more general terms, however, English football has been willing to embrace and promote its status as a community sport, and has regularly made statements on the social good that it can deliver. This is has been done in a variety of contexts, including the UK courts and the European Commission (in response to investigations into the FA Premier League's TV contract with BSkyB); the annual reports of various football authorities and clubs; and the media.

In order to live up to the expectations that the game itself has increasingly helped to establish, our research suggests that the English football authorities and individual clubs need to better articulate the reasons why they are engaging in community-focused work. This is important because it will help to establish a shared vision and a coherent understanding of the game's relationships with its different communities and its obligations in undertaking intervention-based work. Throughout our research, we have encountered a range of understandings in this area. Few of them, however, have been expressed coherently and have often appeared to be 'after the event' rationales, rather than 'up front' strategies.

The different motivations that operate around the game can loosely be split into three categories: ethical motivations; business motivations and political/legal motivations. Ethical motivations take a number of different forms. They include the relatively simple observation that professional football clubs in England are with few exceptions named after places and, therefore, may have a moral obligation to 'give something back' (over and above football entertainment) to the people who they claim to represent. They also include statements on the popularity which English football currently enjoys - which cuts across class, gender, 'race', ethnicity, and age - and the 'power' this potentially affords the game to engage otherwise 'hard-to-reach' social groups.

Another ethical motivation which seems to inspire government thinking in particular on the social role of football is a 'communitarian' argument which argues that football clubs have a potential role in building and sustaining communities: a major concern for the present government. Since 1997, the Blair administration has been heavily influenced by a range of communitarian thinkers when developing social policies. Great emphasis has been placed on the supposed utility of strong, inclusive communities and their abilities to contribute to the tackling of social problems. As football clubs are amongst the most recognised symbols of 'community identity' in contemporary Britain, the government and some

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individuals with English football have become convinced that clubs have an important role to play in building and sustaining communities of various types.

The business motivations that potentially underpin football clubs' community work again take a number of forms. In line with wider business thinking on community approaches and 'stakeholder management', some in English football have expressed to us their belief that community work can help to produce short- or long-term business benefits, or alternatively can help to avoid 'business risks'. Some recent research has shown that engagement with 'social' or 'community' issues can help businesses (such as football clubs) to develop 'reputational advantages' as people increasingly want to be associated with 'brands' which express 'good qualities' such as social and environmental responsibility.[4] Other research has shown that businesses that are perceived to be trustworthy and socially responsible are relatively protected from sudden downturns in trade or hostile public criticism when they perform poorly, or negatively affect the lives of stakeholders in one way or another.[5] This has led some in English football to undertake community work in order that their clubs can build up 'good will banks' of positive feelings and experiences on which different communities can draw when problems arise on or off the pitch.

There are two other main business motivations for undertaking community work that we have encountered during the research. The first is based on an awareness that the high levels of support enjoyed by many English football clubs over the past 10 years cannot be taken for granted. Some individuals in the English game are becoming increasingly aware that attendances could fall significantly if individual clubs and the game as a whole does not now plan for the future and address important industry 'risks'. For some, new forms of community engagement could help to achieve this long-term sustainability. If English football clubs consistently engage with stakeholder groups in a 'just and fair' manner whilst also developing innovative social programmes, the argument has been made to us that they could become re-embedded into the very fabric of different 'communities' across the country. If they do not do this, it is suggested that they could lose their relevance and be overtaken by other forms of leisure.

The second motivation is based on new understandings of what is now often termed 'corporate citizenship'. In recent years, the long academic debates that have developed around corporate social responsibility (CSR) have been slightly refocused to embrace a new sense of obligation on businesses to be 'good citizens'. It is in this debate that ethical and business motivations for companies such as football clubs to perform community-focused roles have been brought together.

In classic CSR writings (and in early writings on Corporate Citizenship), businesses such as football clubs were regarded as hermeneutically sealed, autonomous entities that operated outside of society. This understanding allowed businesses to 'engage with society' (society was 'out there') when it suited them and on their own terms. They could meet ethical responsibilities and develop community programmes if they wished, but this was not *required* of them because they were 'separate from society'. In more recent writings, this position has been rejected as various writers have sought to reposition businesses within the social realm. To explain this, it is worth digressing into a more theoretical debate for a moment.

The starting point for this repositioning has been to re-analyse businesses as the equivalent of individual citizens (like you and I) which have specific rights *and responsibilities*. From an historical perspective, business writers have discussed corporations' fights to obtain the rights of natural entities like people in order that they could be entitled to the same privileges as all other individuals and groups.[6] This fight resulted in corporations being awarded artificial, legal 'personalities' under which they could trade. These personalities were awarded in order that corporations would be free from state interference, but they did not guarantee that corporations would necessarily have to meet set responsibility standards. This is because the dominant liberal understanding of citizenship, which has traditionally operated in countries such as Britain, concentrates almost solely on the rights of individuals (and by implication

businesses).[7] 'These rights are defined as 'positive' rights which are awarded by the state (such as the right to health); 'negative' rights which are protected by the state (such as freedom from undue interference); and 'political' rights which encompass activities such as the right to vote and the right to engage in political lobbying. Whilst 'positive' rights are not really applicable to businesses, private companies continually campaign for 'negative' protective rights, and regularly demonstrate their right to engage in political lobbying through, for instance, donations to political campaigns.'

Since the election of the New Labour government in 1997, the liberal understanding of citizenship has been under attack in Britain as the state has increasingly embraced a more communitarian philosophy which asserts the rights *and responsibilities* of individuals (and by implication businesses) in the communities of which they are members. From the corporate citizenship perspective, this has meant that businesses such as football clubs are no longer given a choice by many writers in terms of whether they engage in community-focused work or not. It is now often fundamentally required of them as part of their responsibilities to the various stakeholder groups into which they come into contact. This means that for increasing numbers of business writers private companies must have effective policies which control and, where possible, reduce the negative effects that they have on their different communities' (e.g. in terms of environmental damage and other forms of 'nuisance'), and must also contribute to the well-being of communities through, for instance, benevolent community policies and practices.

Whilst this debate has not been conducted in quite these terms in English football, it is already having an influence in terms of the expectations placed on football clubs, especially by central government. Since the 1980s, the government has advocated increased partnership working in all areas of social policy as a way of ensuring that the burden of work is shared between the public, private and voluntary sectors. This has meant convincing various elements of the private sector, such as the football industry, that they have roles to play in hosting, providing or supporting services that traditionally would have been the preserve of the state. This is where communitarian-inspired theories on corporate citizenship have proved useful. If it is accepted that businesses have obligations to and responsibilities for their communities, then it becomes very difficult for them to reject requests from government to become involved in the delivery of various social policies. In the context of football, this increasing culture of obligation and the need to be seen as a 'good citizen' has undoubtedly helped the government to engage the football authorities and clubs in a range of public-private partnerships, including the *Playing for Success* education initiative[8] (run by the Department of Health in partnership with the FA Premier League, the Football League, the Football Foundation, local education authorities and clubs) and the Football and Health programme[9] (developed by the Department of Health in partnership with the Football Association, the Professional Footballers' Association, the FA Premier League, the Football Foundation, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and Sport England).

These programmes and others highlight the ways in which business motivations, inspired by new communitarian ideas of what a private business is and what it should deliver, have partly enabled the government to convince English football of the wider role it can play in delivering social and community benefits. Its success in doing this should not be overstated, however, as evidenced by the public row which developed between Charles Clarke (the then Education Secretary) and Ken Bates (the then Chairman of Chelsea FC) in May 2003 over Chelsea's refusal to be involved in the *Playing for Success* scheme.[10] In this, Mr Bates was quoted as stating that 'gimmicks' such as *Playing for Success* would not be needed if the education system was not in a 'state of collapse'. Mr Clarke had earlier criticised Chelsea by suggesting that the club had 'an obligation' to support the scheme.

This debate brings us to the final set of motivations that we have encountered during the research for undertaking community work in English football: political/legal motivations. As English football is

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currently engaged in a range of formal and informal partnerships with government, some individuals within the football industry pointed out to us the political expediency of carrying out this work, particularly in terms of the football industry maintaining government support in a range of areas. The most important of these in recent years has undoubtedly been with regard to the collective selling of television rights, which was first challenged by the Restrictive Practices Count (RPC) in England in 1999 and continues to be contested at a European level to this day. In these cases and others, English football has argued for exemptions from certain aspects of national and European law on the basis that existing arrangements are of public benefit. Given ongoing concern over the regulation of football, some within the football industry have suggested to us that English football needs to continue and further develop its support for community work in order to maintain current regulatory and business practices around the game.

A Possible Way Forward

Through our research we have discovered that the motivations outlined above are all currently rehearsed to varying extents within English football as rationales for undertaking community-focused work. The vital point to note, however, is that many of them are radically opposed to one another and will lead English football in general and clubs in particular in very different directions in terms of how they understand their community obligations, how they design programmes of work, and what returns (if any) they expect to get from such work. Put in its most simple terms, ethical motivations focus on clubs' obligations to their communities and put the needs of communities at the forefront. Business and political/legal motivations focus largely on business practices for football clubs and put the needs of clubs at the forefront.

It is probably too demanding a task to design a single set of coherent motivations which can underpin English football's future approaches to undertaking community engagement and development work. The industry is simply too large and contains too many disparate elements to share in a single understanding of why it should support community initiatives. What is clear, however, is that

different motivations lead to different expectations for clubs and communities, and sometimes to conflicting schemes of work. This issue needs to be strategically managed if English football's approach to community issues is not to be misinterpreted. Current community initiatives operating around the game run the risk of being criticised as commercially exploitative if the rationales behind those initiatives are not more clearly articulated and understood.

At club level we have begun investigating a range of options that might help clubs to separate those elements of their community work that are inspired primarily by the needs of communities, and those that are not. One of the possibilities we have considered is the creation of independent community departments/organisations at football clubs. In recent years, a number of community departments have developed independence from their host clubs, most frequently by adopting charitable status. Whilst the advantages and disadvantages of charitable status are open to debate, we accept that organisational and financial separation between clubs and their community departments might be beneficial, especially when those departments are responsible for community intervention work in areas such as health, education, community safety, crime reduction and regeneration.

From our research, there appear to be a number of potential benefits of adopting such a strategy. The most immediate of these is the fact that independence for community departments will enable clubs to overcome some of the tensions between 'commercial' and 'community' motivations in their work. If community departments at clubs have little organisational or financial independence, their work will usually be tied to the commercial objectives of the club. Independent community departments/organisations will be able to establish their own institutional aims that are tied less to commercial objectives, as long as their independence is both financial and organisational. This could be vital if such departments/organisations are to successfully deliver programmes that are designed primarily to meet the multiple needs of different communities, rather than the direct needs of football clubs.

Independence could also help community departments to establish credibility with potential local partner agencies. Some of the charitable trusts which have been establish in football in recent years have embraced new, inclusive cultures of working and have involved various people from their different communities as trustees, steering group members and volunteers. This has enabled them to develop reputations as credible local agencies that are truly concerned with various communities' needs.

There are, of course, some benefits for clubs themselves in terms of establishing independent community departments/organisations. In adopting this strategy, clubs will no longer have to take direct responsibility for some areas of community work that by their very nature are commercially fragile and politically sensitive. They will also be able to accrue positive publicity from the activities of independent organisations, as long as they have retained nominal links with clubs. Importantly, though, any PR benefits which do develop for clubs from the work of independent departments will be incidental and indirect. It will not be a prime motive for undertaking community development and engagement work.

The re-structuring of community departments in this way is just one option we are considering to help bring clarity to the sometimes confused motivations for undertaking community work which currently operate around English football. There are other, potentially complementary strategies which will also need to be considered at clubs if all their areas of work are to start operating in more community-focused ways: something they will have to embrace if they are to adopt more 'holistic' approaches to community development and engagement. We will fully address these issues and more in our research final report for the Football Foundation C&E Panel, which is due to published in early 2006.

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When will we see your like again?

Stephen Morrow

On September 10 1985 one of Scotland's most talented football managers, Jock Stein, first British manager to lift the European Cup, dropped dead as he rose from the dugout at Ninian Park, Cardiff, seconds after guiding Scotland to their fourth appearance in the World Cup Finals. Twenty years later Scotland has failed to qualify for the 2006 World Cup Finals to be held in Germany; the fourth consecutive major tournament in a decade that it has failed to qualify for. In the twelve years since the advent of the FIFA world ranking for national sides, Scotland's ranking has dropped from 28 to 74, the country's lowest ever ranking.



Where did it all go wrong? Some, like the former Scotland manager, Craig Brown, have argued that the present period of lack of success is cyclical; others are less convinced and see it as an example of systemic failure.

Certainly, there are many factors that have contributed to the decay in Scottish football. Some, like the changing economics of football in Europe and the liberalising of the player market post-Bosman, have been beyond any one country's control. But their impact on football in Scotland has been marked as clubs invested heavily in overseas players in the hope of remaining competitive within the Scottish game and/or becoming competitive in Europe. One inevitable consequence of the influx of overseas players into Scottish football has been the reduction in first team opportunities for young Scottish players. Nowhere has this been this more apparent than at the Old Firm clubs. The respected Scottish journalist and broadcaster, Bob Crampsey, observed that while in the past non-Old Firm fans used to comfort themselves with the thought that at least a strong Rangers and Celtic meant a strong Scotland, in the post-Bosman world of Scottish football, a strong Rangers and Celtic meant only a strong Rangers and Celtic[1]. Of just as much concern is the fact that Scottish players have not found themselves in major demand in other leagues. This is underlined when considering the quantity and quality of Scottish players south of the border. When the World Cup was last played in Germany in 1974, Scotland's squad contained twelve players from major English clubs, including 5 from the 1973/74 champions, Leeds United (Billy Bremner, David Harvey, Peter Lorimer, Joe Jordan and Gordon McQueen). Of the 10 English-based players selected by Walter Smith for the final two matches in the qualifying competition for the 2006 World Cup games against Belarus and Slovenia, 5 play for clubs outside the FA Premiership, while of those playing with

Premiership clubs – Steven Caldwell, Sunderland; Christian Dailly, West Ham United; Darren Fletcher, Manchester United; James McFadden, Everton; David Weir, Everton – not all could be considered regular first team players. Twenty years after Jock Stein's death Scotland's anguish follows the same cycle endured by Wales; namely a continuing failure to reach the finals of major tournaments.

Looking behind results and players, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there has been complacency inside the Scottish Football Association, the body charged with running the game in Scotland. This has resulted in poor and/or non-existent policy making over a number of years in areas like youth development initiatives and developing a high quality sporting infrastructure. But, while the Scottish tabloid press considers it fair to continue to point the finger of blame at the Scottish Football Association, or, more particularly at this juncture, at its present Chief Executive, David Taylor – *'It's too late to own up Taylor ... Just go'*[2]; *'Quit now David'*[3] - what is required is not yet another round of the blame game but rather a reasoned analysis of what is being done and what more might be done to put Scottish football back on track.

In June 2002, the consultants PMP were appointed to review the structure and development systems of youth football in Scotland. Importantly, the review looked holistically at youth football, considering issues as diverse as strategy, player pathways, funding and facilities[4]. In 2004 the Scottish Executive announced that it would provide financial support to the value of £1.2m per annum for the 'Many Players – One Goal' action plan for youth development arising out of the review. The SFA's promise to 'assume an active role in leading the development of youth football in Scotland' was a very welcome, if, critics might say, overdue statement of intent[5]. Clearly there is a need for the SFA, and by extension, its Chief Executive to lead the changes in football and to manage the process of change. Moreover the major challenge now is to ensure that this action plan delivers, and it is important that systems are developed to ensure there is appropriate monitoring and evaluation of the initiative and to achieve public accountability.

In 2004 it was announced that the Scottish Executive and 'Sportscotland' were to provide funding of £51m for new sports facilities network[6]. This announcement was warmly welcomed by many football stakeholders, given that the facilities include five full size indoor football training pitches; the first of their kind in Scotland. By contrast such facilities were available in a country like Norway more than twenty years ago. Nevertheless it remains the case that there is also a need for better quality local facilities, particularly all-weather surfaces. Organisations and individuals spoken to during the Scottish Parliament's Enterprise and Culture Committee's investigation into the need for the reform of Scottish football, considered that a lack of adequate facilities at grassroots or local level was perhaps the most important issue affecting the development of football in Scotland[7].

At the professional end of the game, another factor that can facilitate an improvement in Scotland's football is a competitive league. Much of Europe is witnessing increasingly uncompetitive leagues and more concentrated success. Nowhere is this more apparent than in England where Chelsea had established a firm lead in the Premier League within two months of the start of the season. Paradoxically in Scotland, the country with the most dominated domestic league in Western Europe - since its inception in 1975/76, the Premier League, subsequently the Scottish Premier League, has been won by either Celtic or Rangers in 26 out of 30 seasons – at this stage of the season there is genuine evidence of uncertainty of outcome as to which club will be the 2005/06 SPL champions. This relates partly to the rise of Heart of Midlothian and Hibernian and partly to the poor run of domestic form by Rangers. Leaving aside the excitement this less predictable season is generating for spectators and television companies, it is also surely beneficial for the players to be taking part in more competitive games during the season. Moreover, it is particularly heartening to find Scottish players playing regularly for the clubs at the top end of the Scottish Premier League table. This is illustrated in Table1 which sets out the players from these four clubs who have been involved in the four Scottish international matches so far in season 2005/06 (until the end of October).

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Table 1

Club	Player (age)	International appearances season 2005/06	Unused substitute
Celtic	Craig Beattie (21) Shaun Maloney (22)	v. Italy, Norway v. Belarus	v. Slovenia v. Slovenia
Heart of Midlothian	Craig Gordon (22)	v. Italy, Norway, Belarus, Slovenia	-
	Paul Hartley (29)	v. Italy, Norway, Belarus, Slovenia	-
	Andy Webster (23)	v. Italy, Norway, Slovenia	v. Belarus
	Steven Pressley (32)	v. Norway, Belarus, Slovenia	-
Hibernian	Gary Caldwell (23) Gary O'Connor (22)	v. Slovenia v. Slovenia	v. Belarus v. Belarus
Rangers	Barry Ferguson (27)	v. Italy, Norway, Belarus	-
	Ian Murray (24)	v. Belarus	v. Italy, Norway
	Steven Thompson (27)	-	v. Norway

Notwithstanding the despondency that surrounded Scotland's failure to qualify for the 2006 World Cup finals, at last there is some evidence relating both to short term results on the field and longer term developments that things are starting to get better. Let's hope that the Everton and Scotland defender, David Weir, is correct in his summing up of the situation after Scotland's 3-0 victory in Slovenia: 'Now we can look forward with optimism. Not being silly about it, but we can start having a little bit of hope'[8].

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Cathedrals of Sport: football stadia in contemporary England

Roger Penn

Since 1990 there has been a dramatic transformation in English Premier League stadia. As a result of the Taylor Report (1990), English stadia were rebuilt to incorporate high levels of safety[1]. A central element in this was the requirement that all spectators had to sit rather than stand during matches. The new stadia are impressive sights. In the North West region of England (the historic heartland of the professional game) Blackburn Rovers (see Photograph 1) and Bolton Wanderers (see Photograph 2) have replaced their geriatric stands with ultra-modern, visually dramatic new constructions. Manchester United have rebuilt three sides of Old Trafford to produce England's largest current football stadium with 67,800 seats. Sunderland FC has built a new stadium holding around 50,000 spectators (see Photograph 3). Manchester City moved from Maine Road – an old stadium blighted by poor sight-lines – to the Commonwealth Stadium (now renamed the City of Manchester Stadium) in 2003. These new stadia are amongst the architectural wonders of the age[2]. Indeed, The City of Manchester Stadium featured prominently amongst the iconic buildings catalogued in the monumental *Phaidon Atlas of Contemporary World Architecture*[3]. These new stadia also feature in a range of recent studies of sports architecture[4]. When the organisers of Euro 2008 – which is to be held in Austria and Switzerland - came to England to examine architectural best practice, it was to the stadia in Manchester and Bolton that they headed.

The aim here is to examine two features of these new Premium League stadia. The first is the extent to which the new stadia physically embody powerful emotions within their structures. These affective aspects simultaneously foster connections with the longer histories of these clubs, connections that sometimes link the new stadia to the old abandoned grounds elsewhere. Such links are significant in that they continue to have powerful resonance for both home and visiting supporters. Indeed, they are central to the emergence of new forms of spectator behaviour within these stadia. Related to these developments is a second feature, the absence of graffiti on these stadia. This point will be pursued through a comparison with the graffiti-covered stadia in *Serie A* in Italy.

The new stadia physically embody a range of powerful emotions. This is epitomised by the memorial to the 1946 Burnden Park disaster that has recently been constructed at Bolton Wanderers' new ground, the Reebok Stadium (see Photograph 4). This disaster happened on the occasion of an FA Cup match between Bolton and Stoke City. It involved an over-capacity crowd and the collapse of two barriers and led to the death of 33 spectators[5]. The Memorial contains a book of remembrance with the names of all those who perished, the pages of which are turned regularly in a manner akin to similar books in churches that commemorate those who fell in the two World Wars of the twentieth century. Within the Memorial – which is situated to the side of the stadium, close to the main entrance – is an eternal flame which ensures that the book is visible day and night. Once again this parallels similar flames in cemeteries. Manchester United also have a memorial to the Munich Air Disaster in 1958 (see Photograph 5). This involves a plaque shaped like the old stadium with a pitch marked out in grey and white. The names of the players and officials of the club who died in this tragedy are etched on the pitch. The plaque was originally situated on the pre-1990 stadium but, following renovations, it was moved to a prominent position on the East Stand in the mid-1990s. Just around the corner, on the old South Stand (the only stand not to have been rebuilt during the 1990s) stands the Munich clock which simply reads 'February 6th 1958 Munich', the date of the disaster (see Photograph 6). On the front of the new East Stand stands a statue to Sir Matt Busby, the manager seriously injured at Munich who returned to successfully manage the team to the Holy Grail of the European Cup in 1968 (see Photograph 7). A number of the new stadia have statues often commemorating talismanic players of yesteryear. These include 'Dixie' Dean at Everton's Goodison Park (see Photograph 8), Wilf Mannion and George Hardwick at Middlesborough (see Photographs 9 and 10), Stanley Matthews at Stoke City (see Photograph 11), Tom Finney at Preston North End (see Photograph 12), Jackie Milburn at St James's Park, Newcastle, and Billy Bremner at Leeds. These statues are not only of famous players. At Liverpool, the main statue is of Bill Shankly – the manager who created the modern successful team –

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and the inscription beneath simply reads 'He made the people happy' (see Photograph 13). Anfield also displays a plaque of Bob Paisley, Shankley's assistant, who subsequently led the club to a succession of European Cup victories in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Photograph 14). Blackburn Rovers have erected a statue to the late Jack Walker, their millionaire owner who funded both the new stadium and the team that won the Premier League in 1995 (see Photograph 15). The cost of this statue was borne, not by the club, but by its supporters. It features Walker with arms outstretched, wearing a Rovers' scarf with the inscription 'Rovers Greatest Supporter'. Next to the statue is a commemorative garden with a poem on a stone wall situated behind the shrubs (see Photograph 16). This has become a sacred space for Blackburn fans. Soon after the erection of the statue, families established new 'tradition' of taking one bunch of flowers from the funeral cortege of a deceased Rovers' fan and laying it in homage at the feet of the statue (see Photograph 17). Clearly, he made a powerful impact on local fans. Indeed, immediately after Blackburn's League Cup victory over Tottenham at the Millenium Stadium in 2002 Blackburn fans chorused with the song 'There's only one Jack Walker' as a tribute to their deceased owner. Perhaps the most unusual and the most prominent statue is to be found outside Sunderland's Stadium of Light. Here is a statue to the fans themselves: a man, a woman and two children (see Photograph 18). The inscription below the statue is the most detailed and poignant. It reads:

> 'All generations come together at the Stadium of Light. A love of "The Lads" has bonded together supporters for more than 125 years and will for many more years in the future. At Sunderland it is this statue to the fans that has pride of place. Supporters who have passed away have their support carried on by today's fans, just as the supporters of today will have their support continued through families and friends. We share this vision and bond as one because Sunderland AFC is For Us All' (see Photograph 19).

Outside some of the new stadia are commemorative brick walkways. The one at Bolton features grey square slabs with gold inlaid lettering that feature inscriptions remembering deceased Wanderers' fans (see Photograph 20). These are adjacent to rectangular red bricks with lettering in gold that list various supporters. At Old Trafford the walkway features red brick with the names of supporters in blue-grey amidst bricks with gold letters that name famous United players of yesteryear (see Photograph 21). These walkways bear testimony to the importance of the respective clubs to their supporters and the need to commemorate this allegiance within the space of the stadia themselves. At Bolton's new Reebok Stadium, a series of banners and flags from the former Burnden Park ground have been hung in the foyer of the club's museum (see Photograph 22).

What is the significance of these physical features at the new stadia? They indicate that each new stadium is a sacred space. They give strong emotional attachment to 'home' that characterizes modern sport[6]. These stadia also constitute memorials to the dead. Famous players, managers and even owners are remembered both by statues and commemorative walkways. They are also places where ordinary fans are remembered. In a very real sense the stadia transcend mortality. In their scale and aesthetic grandeur these stadia express both past glories and future hopes. The new Premier League stadia are sites of enormous local pride. Indeed, in towns like Blackburn, Bolton and Sunderland, the new stadia are the most important new architectural sites since 1945. They act as tourist attractions: large numbers come to eat, drink (see Photographs 23 and 24), shop (see Photograph 25) and visit museums (see Photograph 26) and take tours of the stadia themselves. Many simply come to look. Many opposition fans also respect and admire the new stadia, often arriving early to wander around and to shop in club stores.

The fact that there is no graffiti on the new Premier League stadia contrasts dramatically with the municipally owned communal stadia in Italy's Serie A (see Photographs 27 and 28). Paradoxically, some of the Italian graffiti draws upon English hooligan

templates seemingly in an attempt to plug into the widespread myth about English football that continues to pervade current Italian fan culture (see Photographs 29 and 30). Italian stadia are covered in graffiti some of which is explicitly political (see Photograph 31). This feeds upon the longstanding politicisation of Italian football and Italian stadia that have its roots in nation-building aspirations of Mussolini[7] (see Photograph 32). These roots are still strikingly apparent outside the Stadio Olimpico in Rome, home to AS Roma and Lazio, where an obelisk to 'Mussolini Dux' stands at the entrance to the long avenue from the banks of the Tevere to the stadium itself (see Photograph 33). This avenue has a colonnade of carved stones that are some 3 feet high, 5 feet wide and 1 foot in depth. They are embellished by a series of Fascist-inspired nationalist slogans (see Photographs 34 and 35). The walkway itself has a series of explicitly warlike messages etched into its structure (see Photograph 36). Notwithstanding the fact that Bologna has been a city dominated by the Italian Communist Party, its Renato Dall'Ara stadium (see Photograph 37), still has fascist eagles on the main gates (see Photograph 38) and within the entrance to the modernist tower (see Photograph 39) where a bronze statue of Mussolini's used to stand[8]. The politicisation of Italian stadia has been a powerful influence in accounting for the persistence of graffiti. Major Italian cities are also covered in graffiti, much of it political in nature (see Photographs 40, 41 and 42). Indeed, a great deal of the imagery remains tied to the intense political polarization that characterised Italian society in the period 1943 to 1948. The battle between left and right, particularly between Communists and neo-Fascists finds visual expression in many Italian urban settings.[9] Graffiti in football stadia is but another manifestation of this pattern (see Photograph 43).

The fact that English stadia remain graffiti-free seems to demonstrate the power of the stadia and, in particular, the extent to which they have been successful in embodying popular emotions. The new stadia have become sacred spaces. There seems little doubt that the success in combating hooliganism is more than a matter of seated stadia and CCTV. A vital element is the positive emotional affectivity generated by the physicality of the new stadia themselves. It is in this sense that we can talk of 'Cathedrals of Sport'. The new English Premier League stadia inspire awe and express transcendent values. The intimate architectural details enshrined within these stadia simultaneously embody popular emotions and act as a powerful mechanism of control over such emotions.

Photographs

1. Aerial shot of Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers.
2. Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
3. The Stadium of Light, Sunderland.
4. Memorial to the Burnden Park Disaster 1946 at the Reebok Stadium, Bolton.
5. Munich Memorial, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
6. Munich Clock, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
7. Statue of Sir Matt Busby, Old Trafford, Manchester United.
8. Statue of 'Dixie' Dean, Goodison Park, Everton.
9. Statue of Wilf Mannion, Riverside Stadium, Middlesbrough.
10. Statue of George Hardwick, Riverside Stadium, Middlesbrough.
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40. Graffiti, Central Rome 1.
41. Graffiti, Central Rome 2.
42. Graffiti, Central Rome 3.
43. Graffiti, Stadio Olimpico, Roma

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Football Spectators in English and Italian Stadia

Roger Penn

In its examination of the behaviour of football spectators in England and Italy, this article makes central use of photographic evidence from football matches in both countries. Such a method is both innovative and based upon wider traditions of observational research[1]. The recent advent of digital camera technology has encouraged a burgeoning use of visual data as evidence. This approach is particularly appropriate for an understanding of differences between spectators in English and Italian football stadia, since both the game and spectatorship are central elements involved in the spectacle that is modern football[2]. The evidence was collected mainly by the author at a range of matches in England and Italy over recent years. These photographic data formed part of a wider comparative approach to football in England and Italy[3]. None of them were staged: all were taken 'in situ' as matches unfolded. They are presented both as illustrative of much wider structures and, in the view of the author, they can be seen as typical of patterns of behaviour at major football matches in the two countries.

Behaviour of fans in English and Italia football stadia is radically different. Nowadays the main complaints voiced by fans in England about the live football experience are the price of tickets and the lack of 'atmosphere' in the new stadia rather than the activities of other fans[4]. This represents a major change since the dark days of hooliganism in the 1970s and 1980s. The alleged passivity of contemporary English crowds is something of a myth, one that certainly could not be said to have characterised the recent important Champions' League fixtures at Old Trafford or Anfield. People also tend to forget the funereal atmosphere at Old Trafford in the late 1980s before the advent of the all-seater stadium there! Atmosphere is certainly not lacking in Italian stadia and nor is there any shortage of major problems with sections of the fans. The present paper attempts to identify and explain this variation in the forms taken by fan behaviour in the two countries.

The first and most powerful factor lies in the stadia themselves. English stadia are owned by the clubs themselves. Since the Taylor Report[5] a new generation of all-seated stadia have been built in England (see Photographs 1 and 2). Spectators must sit (see Photograph 3): those who stand can be ejected and banned from the stadium, although the latter sanction is rarely used. The majority of home supporters are season-ticket holders, whilst most of the other ticket holders have a known identity as a result of membership schemes and/or credit card sales. Almost all away fans are also season-ticket holders. At Old Trafford, for example, 3,000 away tickets are sent to the visiting club's ground for sale. First refusal goes to their season-ticket holders who can often number over 20,000. Few tickets go on sale beyond this select and identifiable band.

The clubs in England are responsible for the safety of spectators. Their safety is secured by means of a dual strategy of stewarding (see Photographs 4 and 5) and co-operative policing (see Photographs 6 and 7). The stewards, employed by the club, surround the perimeter of the pitch (see Photograph 8) and guide spectators to their seats within the stadium. They are responsible for compliance with the laws and rules that govern spectatorship. The police only intervene when requested by the stewards or when fighting erupts. This is very infrequent within stadia today. Inside the stadium police and stewards cooperate to control the crowd (see Photographs 9 and 10). Outside stadia the police are present but there is no longer a strategy of segregating fans and they routinely mix outside the ground both before and after the match. The police on occasions search away fans but rarely (never in my experience) home fans. The central aim of policing at English stadia is to defuse problems and avoid set-piece battles between fans or between fans and the police.

The situation in *Serie A* is very different. The clubs do not own their own stadia and tickets are sold with few, if any, controls. At the 'derby' match between Bologna and Fiorentina in April 2005 it was possible to buy a ticket for the home *'curva'* 30 minutes before kick-off and enter the away *'curva'*, despite searches and ticket inspection by the *'carabinieri'* (see Photographs 11 and 12). There is little stewarding within Italian stadia (see Photograph 13). The fans are 'autonomous' and anonymous (see Photograph 14). Indeed, they can approach and

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enter the stadium with hoods up and scarves across their faces. They can also bring enormous banners (see Photograph 15) and megaphones, (see Photograph 16), into the stadia in order to facilitate orchestration of their section of the crowd. Recently, it has been stipulated that the banners must have 'bendy' poles, because rigid ones had been used both as spears and for vaulting across the moat that envelopes the perimeter of most of the Italian grounds. Spectators rarely sit down during play (see Photographs 17 and 18).

Away fans in Italy are segregated in a cage with plastic sides at least 40 feet high (see Photographs 19 and 20). The front of the cage has steel bars to contain the fans (see Photograph 21) and the plastic is generally covered in graffiti (see Photograph 22), as are the concourses and seating areas (see Photographs 23, 24, 25 and 26).

The *carabinieri* are prepared for a worst-case scenario. They arrive in enormous numbers, heavily protected in full riot gear (see Photograph 27). Before the match they block streets (see Photograph 28), search all spectators and, in general, inject a strong element of intimidation into the match-day spectacle (see Photographs 29 and 30). At the slightest hint of trouble they line up with their shields (see Photograph 31) and batons and, if deployed, cudgel any fans that cross their path. Any deterioration in the situation presages the deployment of tear gas and water canon.

Much of the ritualised conflict in and around Italian stadia seems aimed more at the police rather than opposition fans. Indeed, the very structure of the day seems more like a carnival of political contestation than a sporting occasion. In April 2005 most of the banners in the home *'curva'* for the Bologna versus Fiorentina match were advocating legalizing cannabis rather than indicating either support for the Bologna team or hostility to their close rivals from Florence. Football matches in Italy seem to be about much more than football – political and regional animosities are integral to the chanting, the ritualised insults and the physical battle that simmer amongst the fans, particularly the 'ultras' situated behind each of the goals.

Summary and Conclusion

Clearly there are major differences in the organization of football matches between England and Italy that have a significant impact upon crowd behaviour. Since the early 1990s the English Premier League has adopted a policy of all-seated stadia that are stewarded by the clubs themselves. The police in England hold themselves in reserve to support the stewards and adopt a conciliatory and relatively passive role. Spectators tend to be known to the stewards because of the overwhelming preponderance of season-ticket holders attending Premier League matches. The situation in Italy is distinctively different. Italian football matches have a strong flavour of carnival and transgression whereas games in the English Premier League are more akin to opera or theatre. Each country has its own set of cultural assumptions and these find expression in very different kinds of crowd behaviour. Given England's reputation for football crowd disorder, the reaction of the Italian sporting press to crowd problems in Italy in the spring of 2005 was infused with more than an element of irony. The English 'model' was held up as a positive example for Italian football. This surely testifies to the distance that English football has travelled since the dark days of the 1980s and also helps to demonstrate the contingent and mutable nature of spectator behaviour in the contemporary era.

Photographs

1. The Stadium of Light, Sunderland.
2. Reebok Stadium, Bolton Wanderers.
3. Deepdale, Preston North End vs. Millwall 2004, All Seated.
4. Stewarding at Sunderland vs. Watford, 2005.
5. Stewarding at Ewood Park, Blackburn Rovers vs. Tottenham Hotspur, 2004.
6. Policing at the Stadium of Light, Sunderland 2005.
7. Policing for Preston North End vs. Millwall, Deepdale, 2004.
8. Ewood Park, Balckburn Rovers vs. Tottenham Hotspur, Stewards React to a Spurs goal.
9. Policing inside the Stadium of Light, Sunderland vs. Watford, 2005.
10. Police and Stewards at Deepdale for Preston North End vs. Millwall.
11. Sarah searched at Bologna, 2005.
12. Entry to Bologna Stadium, 2005.
13. No Stewards at Fiorentina, 2004.
14. Crowd Autonomy at Fiorentina, 2004.
15. Banners at Bologna vs. Fiorentina, 2005.
16. Orchestrating the Fans, Bologna vs. Fiorentina, 2005.

17. Tutti a Piedi at Bologna vs. Fiorentina, 2005.
18. Bologna fans standing at Bologna vs. Reggina, 2003.
19. Fiorentina vs. Sampdoria 2004: The Cage.
20. Fiorentina fans abuse Sampdoria fans after Sampdoria score the first goal, 2004.
21. Front of Cage at Bologna, 2005.
22. Graffiti in front of the Cage at Bologna, 2003.
23. Graffiti, Bologna seating, 2005.
24. Recent Graffiti, Bologna stadium, 2005.
25. Ancient Graffiti, Bologna stadium, 2004.
26. Carabinieri at Fiorentina stadium, 2004.
27. Carabinieri at Bologna, 2003.
28. Carabinieri block street outside Bologna stadium, 2005.
29. Fiorentina, Carabinieri Post Match, 2004.
30. Carabinieri, Fiorentina vs. Sampdoria, 2004.
31. Riot Police in Line at Bologna, 2003.

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The Beautiful Game? Maintaining Club Discipline in Professional Football

Seamus Kelly and Ivan Waddington

Introduction

In an edition of *Singer and Friedlander*, Perry noted that, given the widespread interest in the football manager, 'it is strange that so little is really understood about him and his contemporary role'.[1] It is certainly the case that the literature on the professional football club manager, though growing, remains rather limited. In editions of *Singer and Friedlander* and *Soccer Review*, Carter has outlined the historical origins of football management and has provided a broad historical overview of the development of the role of the modern manager from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[2] Other studies of football management have focused on mangers' job roles and shared beliefs, coaching efficiency, team performance and managerial change.

Useful though these studies are, none of them focus directly on what is arguably the key relationship in football clubs: the relationship between managers and players. In particular, little is known about how relationships between club managers and players are managed on a day-to-day basis. The central focus of this paper is on the relationship between managers and players in relation to the development and imposition of club discipline.

The study reported here was based on interviews with players and managers who were either currently, or who had previously been, employed as professionals within the league structure in England and/or Ireland. Twenty-two players and seventeen managers were interviewed during the 2004-05 season. The playing and/or managing careers of those interviewed lay between the extremes of outstanding professional success and more modest success. Some of the interviewees had played or managed at international level, while others had spent their entire careers in the lower leagues. More specifically, of the twenty-two players who were interviewed, sixteen had had experience as full-time professionals with clubs in the English Premier League. At the time of the interviews, seven were playing as full-time professionals with English league clubs while the remaining fifteen were playing as full-time professionals with clubs in the Eircom Premier League in Ireland. Nine players had played at international level, two at full international level and seven at Under-21 level. The players' ages ranged from 21- 31. Of the seventeen managers who were interviewed, eight had managed clubs in England and three of these were currently managing English clubs. The remainder had all managed professional clubs in the Eircom Premier League. Several interviewees had managed clubs in both England and Ireland. One interviewee had managed a national side.

Establishing Rules of Conduct

It is important to recognise that, although there are some common themes that are found in most clubs, club rules are also characterised by important arbitrary elements. Club rules are normally drawn up and imposed on players by the manager without any discussion with the players. Thus both the rules and the ways in which they are enforced, are left almost entirely to the discretion – or the whim – of the manager and therefore reflect, to some extent, each manager's preferences, experiences and 'pet hates'. As a consequence, both the rules themselves, and perhaps more importantly, the ways in which they are enforced, vary from club to club; indeed, within a club both the rules, and the methods of enforcement, may change when there is a change of manager.

All the managers interviewed saw the establishment of club rules as a key method of controlling the behaviour of their players. One manager described how he established the code of discipline at his club:

> When I took over … we had rules of conduct at the club. There was one [set of rules] previously, but I got the lads to sign up to it … if players were late they got fined. I would never fine players for bookings. You know for verbal maybe [e.g. remonstrating with a referee]. We had little funny fines, like [for not wearing] flip flops [in the shower]…which went into a fund for a drink the end of the season.

All the players interviewed described how each club had its own particular mechanisms for controlling players' behaviour, based largely on the idiosyncrasies of the manager. However, central to all rules was the fining of players who breached those rules. One player said:

> Every club has it; it's a discipline thing. When you go into football, as soon as you go into football you know what the done thing is so you don't complain about it. You know, you're one-minute late [for training] and you're fined a fiver.

Players generally felt that the manager saw financial penalties as a way of hitting them where it hurt most: in their pockets. However, several players - especially those who had played with Premier League clubs in England - pointed out that in the higher leagues, where players' incomes may be very high, the effect of fining players is very limited. One player said:

> Obviously when players step out of line, what the managers do is fine the player, because they feel that that's what hurts them most, hit their pocket. But there is so much money now … if you look in the Premiership, and the top teams and you're fining players, the big, big names, it's like nothing to them.

Different managers lay particular stress on different aspects of players' behaviour, and it is perhaps here that the arbitrary elements of club discipline are most evident. For example, several players stated that some managers have what they (the players) regard as a fixation with punctuality, while others have very strict guidelines relating to 'off field behaviour'. Several players commented on what they saw as the obsession of some managers with players' weight and diet. One player described a previous manager who weighed his players every Monday morning in an attempt to identify those players who had had what the player described as 'a good weekend'. Another player described a similar experience and added:

> It was crazy, like some of us would starve ourselves on a Sunday in case we were overweight. Sometimes he would run us into the ground. Other times he would just fine us. We actually had a 'fat squad' for all those players who the manager reckoned needed to lose weight. They used to be run into the ground.

The Socialisation of Apprentices and Young Professionals

The induction period for a young trainee can be an intimidating experience. Professional football is an aggressive, tough, masculine – and at times violent – industry, and these values are reflected in its workplace behaviours and in the socialisation and social control of young players. In his research on the careers of professional footballers, Roderick[3] noted the advice of a coach at an English Premier League club to his young players: 'smile, be happy in your life, but when you cross that line, whether it is training or a match, you've got to become a bastard. You've got to be a hard, tough bastard'.

All the players who were interviewed were asked to describe their experience of their first manager in professional football. The responses were strikingly similar, with a recurring theme being not just their fear of the manager but also the manager's use of verbal and physical abuse to intimidate young players and to induce fear:

> **Player:** I remember [the manager] was under a bit of pressure at the time. It's not an easy world to live in. I mean the youngsters used to get assaulted all the time. They are just trying to toughen you up I think, and [there was violence] from senior pro's as well. And the manager especially, there would be a fear there you know.
>
> **Interviewer:** So were you afraid of the manager?
>
> **Player:** Yeah, I think especially when you are younger and just getting started. As you get older the fear goes away a bit and you'd stand up for yourself a bit.

continued…

All the players recalled their fear of their managers and coaches when they were young players. One player recounted his experiences as a young professional in a Premier League club in England:

> Oh God it was frightening. He was totally the hardest manager I have ever come across. He f*****g didn't take any s**t at all. Sort of old school in terms of behaviour ... But you pretty much got the drift of it [his approach] after an hour with him. He was very strict. There was a fear factor with him, total fear factor. There was a fear factor that if you didn't perform, you were out. He'd hammer you. He would verbally abuse you if you didn't do it.

The physical and verbal abuse administered to apprentices and young professionals was a recurrent theme in the players' responses. Another player described his manager's approach as follows:

> He would hurl abuse at you all the time. In front of other players, in the office, on your own, or in the office in front of the coach and staff. Now it brought out the best in me. It did bring out the best in me. But I know not all players could hack it, they just couldn't hack it. I know I asked once what his policy on being late was, how much were we fined you know. You weren't late, that was his policy. I think that all players know it. If you are a young lad just coming in, then a manager will just take their frustration out on young players generally.

Physical violence may also be used as a means of intimidating young players. One interviewee spoke about his experiences as a youth team player at an English Premier League club. When asked about the manager's approach to players, he stated that the manager would 'frighten the life out of you, he would use bully tactics ... sure, he used to hit players'. He added:

> I remember [the manager] smacked us all in the head with a cricket bat once. We had training and I remember I was a youth team player at the time, and we used to get kitted in the morning and then get changed, put on fresh kit, go up [for food] but we were meant to put the old kit in the wash bags for the wash man to wash, but I think [the manager] walked by and saw the kit on the ground, went up to his office and got the cricket bat out. He lined us all up, turned the cricket bat to one side … and smacked us all on the head. Yeah, and it was a good hard smack as well.

In describing in more detail this manager's technique for controlling players, he said:

> He would square up to you and everything. Oh, he would have no problems in giving you a clip, and it hurt … he didn't really care. I mean, he was so successful with all the players that he worked with. I mean everyone respected him because he knew what he was doing, everyone was afraid of not doing [what he wanted] ...but on the pitch it would be bully tactics all the way. I mean if you crossed him then it's the worst, he is the worst person ever to cross. It's like the end of the world. Players would be so afraid of him, that's how he got players to do what he said. Players would just do exactly what he said.

Intimidation as an Instrument of Managerial Control

Roderick has suggested that 'workplace behaviours in professional football are more robust and masculine than in any other industry'. Verbal abuse and intimidation, and sometimes the use, or threats, of physical violence, are all aspects of this 'robust and masculine' culture, and not just with respect to young players. Although young players are particularly vulnerable to abuse and intimidation, there is evidence, both from our own data and from the autobiographical writings of professional players, that these techniques are also used against more experienced players. For example, one player described how players were punished for defensive errors (even in training) and for losing matches by being made to do additional running, sometimes at 6 am:

> When we trained, if someone got a clear shot at goal then he would stop training and make us run for twenty minutes. [For] any mistakes at all. We were terrified to make mistakes. It was entirely based on fear. We were scared. After matches that we lost, he would have us in at six in the morning running.

In his autobiography, Mick Quinn, the former Coventry and Newcastle player, described the abuse and violence to which even senior players may be subject:

> On one occasion we came in at half time after what was admittedly a poor performance. He [the manager] smashed all the teacups against the wall above our heads as we sat on the benches. 'You were a f****** disgusting shower of s**t out there'. He pointed to Tony Quinn and screamed; 'You f*****g stank out there, get in the f*****g shower'…Tony got up and left. So he turned to me, 'What's the f*****g matter with you, Quinn?' 'Well', I replied, 'if you got off our backs, we might be able to play'. 'Get in the f*****g shower! You're off' he screamed. So I joined Tony in the baths.

The message conveyed to players was unambiguously clear: the manager's authority was not to be questioned. Those players who did question it were punished, in the above case by being withdrawn from the game. Elsewhere in the book, Quinn describes the arrival of a new manager, Larry Lloyd, at Wigan Football Club. The players were waiting in the players lounge to meet the manager. Quinn described what happened as follows:

> Larry slammed the door open, nearly taking it off its hinges, strode in and bellowed 'Hello, I'm Larry Lloyd. If you don't like what I'm going to say then I'm going to head-butt you'. Everyone looked at one another in amazement.

Other professional players have recorded not just the threat, but also the use, of violence, by managers against players. For example, in his biography, Roy Keane described how the Nottingham Forest manager, Brian Clough – who is regarded by many people as one of the greatest of English managers – reacted to an error by Roy Keane in an important FA cup match:

> When I walked into the dressing room after the game, Clough punched me straight in the face. 'Don't pass the ball back to the goalkeeper,' he screamed as I lay on the floor, him standing over me. I was hurt and shocked, too shocked to do anything but nod my head in agreement. Dressing rooms can be hard, unforgiving places. Being knocked down by Clough was part of my learning curve. Knowing the pressure he was under, I didn't hold the incident against him. He never said sorry.

In not dissimilar fashion, Steve Claridge described being assaulted by his manager John Beck when he was substituted at half time as a player with Cambridge United. Claridge describes the incident as follows:

> At half time I was in the medical room when [the manager] came in, obviously ready for a showdown, and told me to get into the dressing room. 'I'm not doing an effing thing you say any more,' I told him. 'Just stick it up your arse'. He flew at me, trying to head-butt me ... He came at me again, swinging his fists, but I connected first and punched him in the eye…
>
> Anyway, he then took a run at me but I gripped him in a headlock and started punching him… He was kicking and punching back at me. His assistant, Gary Peters … came round the blind side and I was also trying to fend him off. It was pandemonium. At this point Liam Daish arrived and grabbed Beck, while Peters grabbed me and held us apart. We were pulled apart. 'I'll see you after the game', Beck spat at me.

There is some evidence to suggest that the use of various forms of managerial intimidation is so commonplace in professional football that most players not only accept it as a routine part of the life of a professional footballer, but that some players may actually have difficulty in adapting to less authoritarian, and more open and democratic styles of management. This was certainly the view of one experienced manager whom we interviewed. The manager in question had been appointed to an English Premier League club at which the previous manager used abusive and violent tactics similar to those described by Quinn in the example above. In his interview, the manager described how some players at the club had difficulty in adapting to his quiet and more thoughtful style of management:

continued…

Manager: It was my style of leadership, which maybe was unusual for them.

Interviewer: Yes, tell me about your style of leadership.

Manager: I am quiet and I am very analytical. When they lost a game under their previous manager, he would kick in the door and kick players, and lift them up to the wall and say various things … he was very angry. He was furious after he [lost] a match. He was managing through fear. He was scaring the players. Then I came in and was very quiet, and I would say that we would watch the match [on video] tomorrow.

Conclusion

The research reported here examines aspects of the relationship between professional soccer managers and their players, with particular emphasis on the issue of enforcing discipline in professional soccer clubs. More specifically this paper focuses on the ways in which disciplinary codes are established by managers and the sanctions, which are imposed on players for breaches of club discipline. The paper also highlights the arbitrary character of these codes and the central part played by intimidation and abuse, both verbal and physical, in maintaining discipline within clubs.

It is difficult to imagine any other industry in which abuse, intimidation and violence of this kind would be regarded as legitimate instruments of managerial control; indeed, outside the relatively closed social world of professional football, these techniques would almost universally be regarded not just as bad management practice, but they would almost certainly result in cases being brought to industrial tribunals and would probably also result in criminal prosecutions.

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Revisiting Football Hooliganism: England from the late 1950s to 1990

Patrick Murphy

The Rise of Football Hooliganism to the Status of a Serious Social Problem

How did football hooliganism come to be perceived as a serious social problem in England? Prior to the late 1950s, the football crowd disorders that did occur in the U.K. tended to go unreported. The only disorders that were given extensive coverage in the English media occurred abroad and these seem to have been reported upon for their novelty value. The reporting style was smug and took the tone - 'what will these crazy foreigners do next?' These disorders occurred in South America and Southern Europe. They tended to be explained in terms of the 'Latin temperament'.

The media's benign approach to English football crowd disturbances began to change in the later 1950s. In this period, great concern was expressed over youthful violence in other social contexts and, in particular, the focus was upon the disorderly behaviour of teddy boys. Concern about hooliganism in one area of social life generated a more generalised anxiety on the part of the media and the public at large. In consequence, Association Football was one of the areas that received closer scrutiny. The disorders that had to varying degrees long characterised the professional game in England began to be reported in more dramatic relief. An early peak in this concern occurred during the built-up to the 1966 World Cup Finals. The newly emerging tabloid press worked itself up into something of frenzy over the possibility that disorder would tarnish England's reputation under the full glare of the world's media. Also around this time, the popular press began sending reporters to matches to focus upon the crowd rather than the game itself. Not surprisingly, more and more incidents began to be reported and, with this increased reportage came the establishment of new thresholds of press sensationalism. In the course of the 1960s, this consistently dramatic presentation of match-days and football grounds as times and places in which fighting and could be engaged in and aggressive masculinity displayed, attracted growing numbers of young males bent on making a disorderly contribution to the proceedings. This was a gradual process. In fact, it was not until the later 1960s that English football hooliganism began to take on its distinctively recognisable form with the establishment of more organised gangs.

Over the period from the late 1960s to the end of the 1980s, media treatment of football hooliganism was characterised by two overarching tendencies - a predominant one and a weaker, countervailing one. The predominant tendency was for the media to depict football hooliganism as meaningless behaviour and to characterise the hooligans themselves as mindless morons, beasts and animals. No doubt this kind of reaction provided some emotional comfort. It did not, however, advance our understanding of the phenomenon one iota. On the contrary, it closed off any possibility of greater understanding. To define something as meaningless is to render it incapable of being understood. From time to time, another characterisation of football hooliganism emerged in the media. This one explained the behaviour in terms of a conspiracy orchestrated by extreme right-wing groups. While this characterisation contains a germ of truth, it remains a crude over-simplification. However, in this context, the point to stress is the way in which the media over this period happily swung from a position which depicted football hooliganism as 'mindless' behaviour to one which characterised it as 'highly rational'. That the editors were willing to live with these inconsistencies is understandable in terms of their commercial interests and, in particular, their desire to sell newspapers in the context of a circulation war. Both approaches could generate sensational headlines. It is beyond question that the reporting style of the tabloid press in particular made a substantial contribution towards the escalation of the phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s and to shaping its form.

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The upshot of these media presentations was to bring considerable pressure to bear on the football authorities and successive governments. The cry went out that something must be done to control this threat to public order. The culprits must be caught, brought to justice and severely punished. Politicians found themselves under considerable pressure to act before they were quite sure what to do. For the most part, this official reaction took the form of control and containment measures. In this context, it is appropriate to pick up the story in the late 1960s early 1970s when the Lang Report (1969) recommended that football clubs install a system of fences and pens in their grounds to control the rival hooligan groups and provide greater security for orderly fans. These new arrangements certainly made grounds safer for peaceful spectators. They were far less likely to be engulfed by marauding hooligans charging across open terraces. However, these same policies also had important unintended consequences. Concentrating the rival hooligan groups in particular parts of the ground enhanced their feelings of solidarity and their capacity to organise. These emerging characteristics found expression in a greater level of disorder outside the ground in the pre- and post-match phases. Thus, we begin to see the emergence of the process of displacement that came to be a central characteristic the police/hooligan dialectic. The police responded to the greater level of disorder and violence outside the ground by meeting the visiting fans at the local railway and bus stations, marching them to the ground, penning them and then escorting them back at the end of the game. In response to this strategy, those hooligans who were determined to continue their involvement in serious disorder began to discard their flamboyant styles in favour of less conspicuous fashions. To avoid police surveillance they began to travel on ordinary scheduled train services rather than football excursion trains. They arrived in host towns or cities hours before the kick-off and made their way to city centre pubs, sought out the local hooligans and engaged in hostilities. These tactics also enabled them to evade the home club's segregation arrangements and cause further disorder inside grounds. The central frustration for the authorities was that every attempt at containment squeezed the problem into another phase of match-day and from the mid-1970s this process of displacement took a new turn. Groups of English hooligans began to follow their clubs and the national side into continental Europe and their activities culminated in the Heysel disaster of 1985 when 39 people were killed.

Some Examples of Single Causal Explanations

Alcohol Consumption

Single causal explanations for football hooliganism have long been popular. They are easy to grasp and don't tax the brain. Alcohol has been more or less continuously cited as the cause of football hooliganism. It is certainly the case that alcohol has been a central part of the culture of those groups engaged in football hooliganism. The ability to consume large quantities of beer is seen as a mark of manly status. However, it cannot be said to be a deep cause of these disorders because not all the hooligans drink, while many non-hooligans do drink in the context of match days. It has also been the case that some hooligans have claimed to abstain from drinking during certain phases of match-day because a clear head was essential if they were to outwit their rivals and the police. The fact is that many members of these groups are relatively aggressive without drink. Of course, alcohol did put an edge on this aggression, but it is only an element in a more complex explanation. It is also the case that football hooligans themselves helped to foster the link between football hooliganism and alcohol consumption. If, for example, a football hooligan found himself in court charged with assault and was asked to explain his behaviour, he may well have asked himself the question: 'What sort of explanation is more likely to lead to a lesser sentence? 'I was out of my head because I'd drunk too much' or 'I get a buzz out of violence' The answer is self-evident.

Violence on the Field of Play

Another popular explanation for football hooliganism has been in terms of player violence. Again, some evidence can be provided to support an apparent cause/effect link between a violent incident during a match and a violent response from some of the fans.

Nevertheless, it is more appropriate to see violent play as a pretext for a hooligan response. After all, only a minority of fans react to violence on the pitch in this disorderly way. In any case, many incidents of disorder occurred in the pre-match context and, therefore, cannot possibly be 'caused' by particular incidents during the match itself.

The Wider View

In addition to attributing football hooliganism to a single cause, the above explanations see the problem of football hooliganism as being rooted specifically in football. In contrast, let me offer a highly condensed version of the explanation my colleagues and I constructed as a result of our researches[1]. Let me begin by identifying two persistent and obvious characteristics of football hooliganism in England.

First of all, football hooliganism is overwhelmingly a male preserve and, secondly, hooligans are not peaceful citizens. They derive satisfaction from engaging in aggressive activities. If these two characteristics are drawn together, we are in a position to establish a provisional definition of football hooliganism. It is a form of aggressive masculinity; it is expressive of an aggressive masculine style. What else do we know about these hooligans? All the systematic evidence that has been compiled on the social class background of football hooligans in England indicates that they come, not exclusively, but predominantly from lower class communities. The predominantly working-class character of football hooliganism gives rise to a question - what is it about the structure of certain lower-class communities and the position they occupy in the broader society that generates this distinctive and intense aggressive masculine style? It is a style that finds expression not only at football matches, but also within their communities, in pubs and clubs, in towns and city centres on a Saturday night and in other venues, such as popular holiday resorts. Let us reflect at greater length on this type of community. When compared to other communities, they seem to exert relatively little pressure on individuals - and in particular, males - to exercise self-control over the use of physical aggression. The higher levels of aggression characteristic of relationships within these communities in turn foster and sustain higher levels of

tolerance towards this aggression. In addition, other aspects of these communities seem to work in the same general direction. For example, the relatively rigid division of labour between the sexes and the dominance of men over women tends to minimise any potential that there might otherwise be of a softening female influence. Indeed, many women in these communities grow up to be relatively aggressive themselves and to expect relatively aggressive behaviour from their males and this serves to reinforce the aggressive propensities of their men. These standards of behaviour find expression in a range of conflicts within these communities, such as the regular occurrence of family feuds, but they probably find their strongest expression in what are sometimes referred to as 'street corner gangs'. These gangs or alliances seem to have their origins in the comparative freedom from adult control experienced by many lower class children and adolescents - in particular males. Pushed out on to the street at an early age, they inter-act relatively aggressively with one another. For defensive and aggressive purposes, they develop dominance hierarchies based on age and physical strength. The conferral of prestige on males who can fight encourages them to develop a love of fighting and to come to see fighting as a central source of meaning and gratification in their lives. Indeed, for many, it is one of the few sources of status available to them.

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Nevertheless, while such communities tend to be internally divided by a range of conflicts their members still have the capacity to gain a degree of overall unity as a result of a threat or perceived threat from outsiders. These may be more powerful outsiders, such as authority figures, like police officers, but of more relevance here is the threat – perceived or otherwise - posed by similarly placed outsider groups in adjacent lower class communities; communities with members who have undergone similar processes of socialisation and are subject to similar social constraints. Therefore, while they are characteristically divided, these communities do possess a capacity to combine in the event of 'an external challenge'. Indeed, it is the nature of this threat which seems to determine the level at which alliances are formed. Let me illustrate this point by returning to the issue of football hooliganism. Just as otherwise hostile groups in a community combine in the event of a dispute with a rival community, in the context of football matches, they are prepared to combine in the cause of football club solidarity. If the challenge is perceived in regional terms, club enemies have been known to join forces. At international level, these community, club and regional rivalries have tended to be subordinated to the defence of the national reputation. Finally, in the context of international tournaments, hooligan groups from different countries have on occasions formed alliances. At the same time, at each of these levels, particularly if the opposition groups do not turn up in sufficient strength to constitute a credible challenge, lower level rivalries have been apt to re-emerge. The general point to grasp is that it is the nature of the opposition which tends to determine the level at which the temporary alliance is formed.

Football crowd disorders occur in many countries throughout the world. In some countries this behaviour has a political dimension. In others it coalesces with religious conflicts. In yet others it is an expression of ethnic divisions. In addition, there are also societal variations in the social origins of the participants and this can only be understood in terms of the specific histories of these countries. The common core of these variations on the form taken by football hooliganism seems to be that they are predominantly a male activity, an expression of male aggression.

References

1. See, for example, the following books:- *Fighting Fans: Football Hooliganism as a World Phenomenon*, University College Dublin Press, 2002, 270p (editors E. Dunning, P. Murphy, I. Waddington, and A.E. Astrinakis); *Hooligans Abroad*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989, 225 p (Second edition J. Williams. E. Dunning and P. Murphy); *The Root of Football Hooliganism: An Historical and Sociological Perspective*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1988, 273p (E. Dunning, P. Murphy and J. Williams) and *Football on Trial*, Routledge, 1990, 240p (P. Murphy, E. Dunning and J. Williams).

In a State of denial: Football hooliganism in England in the 1990s

Patrick Murphy

From the perspective of someone interested in football hooliganism, the period since 1990 has been one of the most fascinating and least explored. In this regard, the World Cup Finals in Italy in that same year constituted something a watershed in the transformation of the prevailing image of the English game. From the late 1960s to 1990, football hooliganism was routinely regarded as one of England's major social problems. It caused the football authorities much consternation, it generated little short of apoplexy in sections of the media, it absorbed significant amounts of Parliamentary time and it was perceived as having a highly detrimental impact on England's international reputation. So much so, that at one point in the late 1980s, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, threatened to close down the English professional game. It is against this backcloth that the period from 1990 onwards needs to be understood.

The years 1989 and 1990 were characterised by a number of important developments. Following the Hillsborough disaster, the Government resolved to impose a new range of controls on football. In particular, Thatcher wanted the blanket introduction of an identity card system. The vehicle for this ambition was to be the Football Spectator Act. However, this strategy was undermined by Lord Justice Taylor's report on the Hillsborough Disaster which came out very firmly against identity cards. The drive towards this objective was further weakened by Thatcher's removal from office. John Major replaced her and, unlike his predecessor, he had a long-standing interest in football. There was also substantial pressure from the All Party Parliamentary Committee on Football for a new and distinctively more sympathetic approach to the game. Major's Government also embraced a recommendation of the Taylor Report, namely, that football stadia should undergo a radical programme of modernisation and, to this end the new government ensured that the 'Football Trust' was geared up to help clubs finance this operation. In the same year, the Government withdrew its opposition to the FA's annual application to UEFA for the re-admission of English clubs to European cup competitions, following the ban imposed after the Heysel disaster. As a result of these combined processes, the football problem was, in effect, more or less depoliticised, at least as far as Westminster was concerned.

It was against this more positive backcloth that England embarked upon its World Cup campaign in Italy. On the spectator front, while some England fans were involved in disorderly incidents during the World Cup Tournament, in retrospect one can detect the emergence of a less sensationalistic style of reporting on the part of the UK media. Moreover, great prominence was given to the award of the FIFA 'Fair Play' Trophy to the England team. Even the fact that the team's semi-final exit on penalties was followed by disorders in some 60 towns and cities in England was not allowed to detract from the burgeoning feel-good factor. Since Italia 90 and for most of the 1990s the picture emanating from Government circles, the football authorities and the media has been that, save the odd hiccup or two, the problem of football hooliganism had more or less been resolved. Politicians, football officials and the media were not the only groups that embraced this view. A number of academics were equally susceptible to the seductive attractions of the feel-good factor. For example, Ian Taylor referred to the 'extraordinary absence of hooliganism and other ugly incidents from English football grounds during the 1990-91 season'. His observations led him to write of 'an astonishing sea-change taking place in the culture of some of England's football terraces.' He concluded that 'hooliganism has suddenly become decidedly unfashionable, passé, irrelevant'[1].

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This then was the pervasive image of the English game that emerged after the 1990 World Cup. Let us now take a step back from the prevailing consensus and engage in a rather more measured appraisal of the period. It is important to begin by recognising the momentous changes which characterised the development of English Football in the 1990s; the establishment of the Premier League in 1992; the advent of satellite television; the influx of overseas players; the implications of the Bosman ruling and the growing commercialisation of the game. The climate of denial surrounding the hooligan problem was associated with some of these developments. A central plank in the prevailing view that the hooligan problem had been resolved was that the new all-seated stadia had somehow 'civilised' the behaviour or deterred the attendance of the hooligan fans. This process was further facilitated, so the argument goes, by the concerted effort to try to transform football into a 'safe,' family game. The official line focused unblinkingly on football grounds. At the beginning of the 1995-96 season, at the instigation of the Home Office, a police press conference was held. Its central purpose was to publicly celebrate the progress that had been made in the struggle to defeat football hooliganism and, by way of confirmation of progress to date, it was announced that the number of arrests made in and around football stadia when compared with the previous season had fallen by 9%. Before accepting this figure at face value (and we will return to the issue of its validity later in the paper), it is as well to recognise that the statistics relating to arrests at and ejections from football grounds have always been highly problematic. They have always revealed more about the diverse strategies of different police forces than they have about the activities of hooligans.

What then is the countervailing evidence that challenges the prevailing thesis of the 1990s that football hooliganism had been more or less defeated? Let's begin with those disturbances that received more publicity, such as when England fans rioted in Sweden in 1992, in Amsterdam in 1993, in Dublin in 1995 and the battles that took place on the streets of Marseilles during the World Cup in France in 1998. The disorders in Marseilles involved an estimated 600 to 700 English hooligans. In the face of the disturbances in Sweden and Amsterdam proponents of the 'football hooliganism is dead thesis' tried to maintain their position by arguing that English hooligans have become peaceful at home and only engage in violence abroad.

To demonstrate the weakness of this proposition, one only has to recall the events following England's elimination by penalties at the semi-final stage of the Euro 96. The *Daily Mail* report reads as follows:

> The agonising moment when Gareth Southgate's penalty was saved … was the trigger for a night of sustained hooliganism. Draped in flags and brandishing bottles, thousands spilled out of pubs and bars … within moments of Germany's victory … The worse flashpoint came in Trafalgar Square… [I]t was the centre of … orchestrated rampage … Up to 2,000 people poured into the square shortly after 10.06 pm … [T]he situation rapidly deteriorated … Cars and motorists … found themselves engulfed in the rapidly-escalating violence with German Volkswagens and Mercedes quickly singled out. A hard core of 400 hooligans … burst out of the square and attacked a police patrol car. The two officers inside had to flee for their lives as in less than a minute the car was smashed to pieces. The hooligans surged towards the Thames, shattering windscreens, turning one vehicle over and setting fire to a Japanese sports car … Between 10.10 pm and midnight, police received 2,500 calls requesting urgent help. Of these 730 were related to violent disturbances … The final toll around Trafalgar Square was 40 vehicles damaged, six overturned and two set alight. Seven buildings were damaged with 25 police officers and 23 members of the public injured across London, as well as a further 18 casualties, both police and civilians, in Trafalgar Square itself … Nearly 200 people were arrested across London with 40 held during ugly scenes in Trafalgar Square.[2]

Yet within months, the authorities and the media were gripped by a kind of collective amnesia as the

Government gave its active support to the bid for the 2006 World Cup. For example, reflecting on Euro 96, Martin Thorpe writes that the authorities achievement in 'avoiding trouble off it [the field] will go down well with FIFA when it chooses a venue for the second World Cup of the new century'.[3]

Given the policy of denial that prevailed through most of the 1990s, systematic evidence on disorders in the context of domestic football is not easily acquired. We have, however, managed to obtain some data. Consider following statistics supplied by the British Transport Police (BTP):

Football-related incidents known to British Transport Police, 1990-1994

Season		Number of Incidents
1990-1991	(21/8/90 to 5/6/91 - includes end-of season play offs)	**204**
1991-1992	(21/8/90 to 5/6/91 - includes end of season play offs and one international)	**260**
1992-1993	(8/8/92 to 31/5/93)	**127**
1993-1994	(24/7/93 to 22/12/93 - first half of season only)	**64**
1990-1994	(incidents in conjunction with pre-season friendlies)	**12**
	Total	**667**

Thus, the BTP recorded a total of 667 incidents in the context of travel to and from football matches between August 1990 and December 1993 - a period of some three and a half seasons - and, of course, it is important to bear in mind that the sphere of operations of the BTP is but one dimension of match days. It should also be appreciated that these data, like all statistical data, are not unproblematic. A more careful assessment of them would entail determining the assumptions and practices underlying their compilation and the ways in which these procedures might have changed over time. Nevertheless, contrary to the prevailing view in official and media circles, they do indicate that, in broad terms, football hooliganism had far from disappeared in this period. What is particular worthy of note is that hardly any of these incidents were reported in the media. The same observation applies to the following information obtained from a source in the Police Intelligent Unit:

Selected incidents of football hooliganism at or in conjunction with matches in England and Wales - Season 1992 -1993

Date	Match	Details
7/10/92	Notts. Forest v Stockport	CS gas, 8 police officers hurt
18/10/92	Sunderland v Newcastle U.	30 arrests & 200 ejections
31/10/92	Leyton O. v Swansea	Fights in London (Marble Arch)
31/10/92	Grimsby v Portsmouth	Missiles thrown at players
14/11/92	Darlington v Hull C.	Pub fights in city centre & station
16 & 24/11/92	Stoke C. v Port Vale	Fights inside & outside ground & town centre
19/12/92	Chelsea v Man U.	CS gas thrown in Covent Garden pub
12/1/93	Southend v Millwall	Pitch invasion, pub fights

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16/1/93	Tranmere	Fan beaten to death (seems motive was more racial than football-related)
19/1/93	Cardiff v Swansea	Pitch invasion & pub fights
30/1/ 93	Leicester v West Ham	Fights outside ground, CS gas thrown in pub
20/2/93	Spurs v Leeds	300 in fight, CS gas thrown in pub
5/3/93	Spurs & Blackpool	Fighting in Blackpool prior to Spurs/Man C. match
7/3/93	Man C. v Spurs	Pitch invasion & fighting outside ground
17/3/93	England U18 v Ghana U18	Attack on police
3/4/93	Shef Wed. v Shef U.	Fighting, murder
3/4/93	Millwall v Portsmouth	Pub fights, missiles thrown
24/4/93	Peterborough v Leicester	Pitch invasion, arson
28/4/93	England v Holland	Pub fights, police attacked
1/5/93	Reading v Swansea	Fights inside & outside the ground, pitch invasion
2/5/93	Aston V. v Oldham	Disturbances in Oldham, riot police in action
4/5/93	Exeter v Port V.	Referee attacked by fans
8/5/93	Millwall v Bristol R.	Pitch invasion, missiles thrown
8/5/93	Halifax v Hereford	Fighting inside ground, mounted police used
Div. 1 Play-off semi-final	Portsmouth v Leicester (Notts. Forest ground)	Fighting outside ground
Div. 1 Play-off Final	Swindon v Leicester (Wembley)	Leicester hooligans ransacked Wembley pub Disturbances in Swindon

If we focus upon the 1992-93 season, the season covered in both sets of data, we find that 154 incidence were officially recorded. The vast majority of these occurred outside or at some distance from football grounds. As such they were less likely to be seen by the media. However, since the police recorded these incidents, it remains to be explained why these disorders were not brought to the media's attention and, if they were, why the media deemed them to be insufficiently newsworthy to warrant coverage. The focus of the 1995 Police Press Conference, referred to earlier, was upon the decline in number of arrests inside grounds and within the vicinity of grounds. The arrest figure for football related offences at some distance from grounds would have provided a more rounded picture of match-day behaviour, but it was not disclosed. It transpires that the police were in fact under instructions from the Home Office not to reveal this figure. It seems, however, that the missing figure indicated a 71% increase in football related arrests away from football grounds when compared with the previous season. But why should the Home Office and the police engage in this charade? One does not have to search long for an answer. The primary aim of the press conference was to provide substantive proof of the progress made in the fight against football hooliganism. Therefore, the figures were

selected to serve this purpose. This mission was accomplished, with the assistance of gullible journalists. It is the case that some football related disorders were reported in the media in the 1990s, but up until Euro 2000, they tended not to be treated in the sensationalistic way similar disorders were covered in the previous decades. The only disorders that received rather more extensive coverage were those that occur in two contexts. Firstly, there were those disorders that happened abroad and to which the international media paid greater attention, such as the one in Dublin, on the occasion of England's game against the Republic in 1995. Secondly, there were those disorders that were sufficiently intrusive to demand reporting, such as the riots following England's exit from Euro 96 and, more recently, the pitch invasions that burst onto our television screens in the context of England's game against Turkey in 2003 at the Stadium of Light. When the problem broke through the shield of official denial, understandably the public - particularly the non-soccer going public - were shocked. Having formed the belief that the problem has been cracked, the reasons for its seemingly sudden rebirth were difficult to fathom. The official response has tended to involve bland reassurances that this was but a blip. These reassurances have also been accompanied by unconvincing explanations, sometimes provided by academics trying to dig themselves out of a hole of their own creation. Cultivating a climate of denial no doubt served some ulterior motives, but when the official picture was shown to be at variance with events on the ground, it fostered confusion. Moreover, nurturing a belief that has little substance cannot possibly constitute a firm basis on which to develop an effective and more comprehensive counter-hooligan strategy.

How can we begin to explain the belief that prevailed for most of the 1990s that the problem of football hooligan had all but disappeared? Clearly, there have been vested interests involved, groups who had an interest in reconstructing the image of football for commercial, nationalistic and even party political reasons. Elements of news management are also apparent. It is, however, important to avoid falling into the simplistic trap of embracing a conspiracy theory. It is self-evidently the case that conspiracy is part of social life. We all conspire on occasions. We have all denied other people knowledge that would have been relevant to their perceived interests. And, of course, the more powerful the individual or group, the greater is their capacity to control and shape the flow of information. However, this recognition is a long way short of embracing a full-blown conspiracy theory whereby everything that happens in human history is seen as a consequence of intrigue by the powerful. The weakness of this approach stems from the fact that the social world is too complex for any person or group to exercise anything remotely like this measure of control, no matter how powerful they may be. Virtually everything people do in the course of pursuing their interests has unforeseen consequences. Having spoken to many journalists about the under-reporting of football hooliganism during the 1990s, I am persuaded that rather than them being participants in a conspiracy of silence, they are more aptly characterised as consumers of the prevailing myth. From the Home Office perspective - under both Conservative and Labour administrations - there are substantial grounds for suspecting an attempt to cultivate a rosy picture and the figures were massaged to achieve this end. If successive Home Secretaries had been willing to acknowledge this strategy of denial, they might have attempted to justify it on the grounds that it was depriving the hooligans of the 'oxygen of publicity' or that it was geared to the attempt to bring the World Cup to England in 2006. While the first justification is somewhat simplistic, it does contain a defendable rationale, one perhaps inspired by the approach of the Scottish football authorities over an extended period of time. With regard to the second justification, while the objective was understandable and may have been shared by the majority of football supporters, predictably, this strategy of denial proved to be a very tenuous basis on which to mount the World Cup campaign.

There is perhaps another dimension to the strategy of denial. The highly selective flow of information on the issue of football hooliganism to the media and through them to the public at large over this period was probably engendered partly and, understandably, by the government's distrust of the media and the

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electorate. The Government and state officials place little faith in the 'populist' section of the media and the public's capacity or desire to assess more voluminous and complex data, and therefore, Government and state officials have little confidence in the ability of the media and the public at large to draw balanced, measured conclusions. Given the propensity of sections of the media for generating moral panics and the willingness of the 'public' to engage in them, there is more than an element of truth in this view. But then, what have politicians as a group done to cultivate a greater capacity for balanced appraisal in the people they purport to represent? It has been said that the electorate get the politicians they deserve. That may be so, but given the power inequalities involved, might it not be truer to say that politicians get the electorate they deserve? We live in a period where politicians are often accused of 'spin' and many calls are made for them to abandon this approach. In my view this is a naïve aspiration because 'spin' is as old as politics. The reality is that we live in a society where political 'spinners' are engaged in an on-going struggle with 'spinners' in the media. The hope that they will forsake their spinning ways is a forlorn one. The most effective way of offsetting the insidious effects of news management techniques is to develop the critical and analytical skills of citizens.

References

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The Convoluted History of Recent Legislative Attempts to Ban Football Hooligans

Patrick Murphy

An overview of recent legislation

Under the Public Order 1986 'an exclusion order may be made by a court when dealing with a person convicted of a football-related offence, whether committed on a journey to or from a match or at the ground and two hours before or one hour after a match…It prohibits the subject of the order from attending any prescribed football match in England and Wales for a given period… Orders are issued for a minimum of three months and there is no maximum duration. Breach of an order is a criminal offence attracting a maximum sentence of one month's imprisonment or a level three fine (currently £1,000); and the police can arrest a person they reasonably suspect of committing such an offence'. Under the Football Spectator Act 1989 restriction orders were introduced. They were an extension of the exclusion principle to matches outside England and Wales. Under the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999, exclusion orders were superseded by Domestic Football Banning Orders, (DFBOs), and restriction orders were replaced by International Football Banning Orders, (IFBOs). The Football (Disorder) Act 2000 combined aspect of both domestic and international football banning orders into one banning order.

How effective was the enforcement of this legislation?

What accounts for these changes in the law relating to restrictions on who can and cannot attend football matches at home and abroad? Exclusion orders were introduced as a means of curtailing and controlling disorderly behaviour at domestic matches and restriction orders were a later application of the same principle to football matches abroad. How effective did they prove to be in practice? It has been claimed that it is difficult to provide precise figures for the number of orders in operation at any particular time because they accumulate in the course of a season and because the enforcement period for specific orders is continuously lapsing. This, however, does not seem to be a very persuasive argument on two counts. Firstly, in practical terms, tracking these developments does not appear to be a particularly difficult technical problem. Secondly, monitoring how effectively legislation is being implemented is surely of crucial importance. One might be forgiven for assuming that an efficient and effective monitoring system would be an intrinsic component of any piece of legislation. However, notwithstanding these apparent difficulties, it is estimated that up to March 1996 some 6,303 exclusion orders were issued and at this same point in time 308 were still in force. According to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) by 14 April 1999 there were 385 in force and another 50 were being processed and by May 2000 there were 218 people subject to exclusion orders made under the Football Spectator Act 1986 and 170 subject to domestic banning orders under the Football Offences and Disorder Act 1999. The figures for restriction orders (or as they later became known, International Football Banning Orders) are as follows:

Restriction and International Banning Orders
England & Wales 1990 to 2000

Orders made	Restriction	International	Total Bans
1990	19	…	19
1991	4	…	4
1992	2	…	2
1993	nil	…	0
1994	1	…	1
1995	1	…	1
1996	1	…	1
1997	10	…	10
1998	100	…	100
1999	18	3	21
2000 (to end - June)	…	28	28

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People subject to Orders as of	Restriction	International	Total Bans
May 1995	2	...	2
December 1997	10	...	10
January 1998	9	...	9
March 1998	30	...	30
June 1998	71	...	71
April 1999	113	...	113
May 2000	87	19	106

Thus, from 1986 until March 1996, 6,303 exclusion orders were issued while from 1989 until June 2,000 only 187 restriction/IFBOs had been imposed. While these figures are not for the same time periods, it is still evident that over this time span there was a substantial discrepancy between the number of exclusion and restriction orders issued. On the basis of these figures, approximately 573 exclusion orders were issued per annum between 1986 and 1996 and 15.5 restriction orders were issued per annum between 1989 and 2000; a ratio of nearly 40 to 1 in favour of the domestic variant.

Notwithstanding the data gathering and monitoring problems, this discrepancy was recognised by Government and became an issue of some concern. In June 1995, Tony Baldry (then a junior Foreign Office minister) said: 'It is a reasonable inference that, given the small number of restriction orders that have been made, that the scheme is not working as well as we would have wished'. On 31 May 1995 a circular was issued to the police and the courts reminding them of their legal powers to impose restriction and exclusion orders. Yet this does not seem to have had a marked effect on the number of restriction orders issued, and in December 1997 the Home Secretary announced that he had written to all courts and prosecutors in England reminding them again of the availability of these orders. Clearly, this growing concern was related to the fact that not only was the World Cup a mere six months away, the host country, France, was a convenient destination for English hooligans. In January 1998 only 9 restriction orders were in force and this figure had only risen to 71 when the finals commenced in June. The number of exclusion orders that were in force at this time was between 600 and 700, but of course, those subject to this type of order were not prevented from travelling abroad to matches. The discrepancy between the numbers subject to restriction and exclusion orders may go some way towards accounting for the involvement of some 700 English hooligans in the disturbances on the streets of Marseilles.

The disorders in France stimulated a legislative response. The Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 introduced Domestic Football Banning Orders and International Football Banning Orders to supersede the more ambiguously named exclusion and restriction orders. It is interesting to compare the bans relating to domestic and international matches. In May 2000 388 people were subject to an exclusion order or a DFBO, whereas only 106 were subject to a restriction order or IFBO. Clearly, the discrepancy between the use of exclusion and restriction orders had not been resolved by this new legislative reform. However, what is more surprising is that when these figures are divided into those pertaining to the old and the new system, we find that there were 218 exclusion orders in this month of May and 87 restriction orders. This compares with 170 DFBOs and only 19 IFBOs. Thus, under the new legislation the ratio in favour of internal, as opposed to external bans, rose by a factor of 3.6.

The penny drops

On the eve of the 2000 European Championships in Belgium and the Netherlands, much of the optimism surrounding football's hooligan problem had dissipated and had been replaced by a more realistic attitude. This found partial expression in the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 that combined the two banning orders. It may have been a growing appreciation of

how the legislation was being interpreted by the courts that led Westminster to recognize that the distinction between the domestic and international dimensions was a self-created, superfluous obstacle to their counter-hooligan strategy.

However, this more realistic approach came into effect too late to make an appreciable, immediate impact, hence the involvement of a substantial number of English hooligans in the disturbances in Belgium and the Netherlands. These disturbances also helped to scupper England's campaign to host the 2006 World Cup. Nevertheless, the greater effectiveness of combining the two banning orders in the 2000 Act goes a long way towards accounting for the fact that Euro-2004 was relatively free of crowd disorder. But with the next World Cup in Germany just a matter of months away, many of the banning orders that prevented convicted hooligans from attending the European Championships in Portugal are lapsing. It will be interesting to see how the authorities cope with this all too predictable outcome of the legislation. Crisis management or to call it by its more accurate and less professionally sounding name –'knee-jerkism' - is often only made necessary by a lack of reasonable foresight.

What accounts for the gap between the legislation and its enforcement?

The question remains, how did this discrepancy between the counter-hooligan legislation and its use by the courts arise? On the basis of inside information it seems that the implementation of this legislation was under-resourced and neither magistrates nor the police were properly inducted into its 'subtleties'. This lack of due diligence also seems to have found expression in the monitoring procedures. This apparent failure to properly resource the implementation and the monitoring of the legislation may well have been associated with the complacency that characterised both Conservative and Labour Governments over the course of the 1990s. Seemingly, they were beguiled by the illusionary effectiveness of their policy of downplaying the scale of the football hooligan problem. In effect they swallowed their own propaganda. Under the Blair Government this complacency also came to be tinged with a measure of wishful thinking linked to the desire to bring the 2006 World Cup the England. Thus, pursuing a policy of pushing the problem out of sight or, at least, beyond the public gaze, proved to be self-defeating. It provides an illuminating example of collective self-deception. The paradox is that groups who set out to deceive ended up pulling the wool over their own eyes.

A supplementary, but nevertheless significant, point is that the distinction between exclusion and restriction orders never made any sense. From the outset, when the courts decided to impose an exclusion order on a convicted football hooligan, there would have been nothing lost if it had been combined with a restriction order. If the hooligan in question was not in the habit of travelling abroad for matches, he would have been unaffected by this linkage. It would, however, be difficult for the courts to determine a hooligan's intentions to travel abroad to attend matches in advance and, therefore, combining the two orders would have provided an additional element of security. The central question remains – Why, in a parliament well stocked with 'legal brains', did it take a decade for this self-evident penny to drop?


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